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ABSURDITY IN DISGUISE: HOW COURTS
CREATE STATUTORY AMBIGUITY TO
CONCEAL THEIR APPLICATION OF THE
ABSURDITY DOCTRINE
Laura R. Dove*
Although explicitly invoked only in rare cases, the absurdity doctrine is far
more robust in practice than commonly assumed. This is because of a phenomenon I call “absurdity in disguise,” wherein judges use the anomalous or undesirable results of applying a statute’s ordinary meaning to “create” statutory ambiguity, opening the door to a variety of interpretive tools that would otherwise be
unavailable. Ironically, the use of ambiguity to conceal the use of the absurdity
doctrine is a direct result of judges’ increasing acceptance of textualist methods
of statutory interpretation. Because textualism eschews results-oriented interpretive approaches, judges who wish to avoid a result of applying statutory text as
written must employ text-centric arguments to do so. This article identifies the
concept of absurdity in disguise and reveals its use in a variety of decisions at all
levels of the federal courts.
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The process of judicial reform requires three steps. The first of these is to divine some single “purpose” which the statute serves. This is done although not
one statute in a hundred has any such single purpose, and although the objectives of nearly every statute are differently interpreted by the different classes
of its sponsors. The second step is to discover that a mythical being called “the
legislator,” in the pursuit of this imagined “purpose,” overlooked something or
left some gap or imperfection in his work. Then comes the final and most refreshing part of the task, which is, of course, to fill in the blank thus created.
Quod erat faciendum.1
INTRODUCTION
That judges make law, rather than merely discover it, has been broadly (if
grudgingly) acknowledged at least since the advent of legal realism.2 Yet judges’ discomfort in acknowledging this fact—and attempts to obscure their lawmaking—have also been well documented.3 Judicial and scholarly proponents
of textualism, a method of statutory interpretation, are some of the most vocal
1

Lon L. Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARV. L. REV. 616, 634 (1949).
See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL
TEXTS 5 (2012) (“It used to be said that judges do not ‘make’ law—they simply apply it. In
the 20th century, the legal realists convinced everyone that judges do indeed make law. To
the extent that this was true, it was knowledge that the wise already possessed and the foolish could not be trusted with.”).
3 Cf. Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use of Authority in Statutory Interpretation: An Empirical
Analysis, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1073, 1108 (1992) (“Although the data reveal a role for practical
considerations, it is quite likely that these figures undercount the role such consequentialist
concerns play in the Court’s decisionmaking [sic] process. As commentators have repeatedly
suggested, practical considerations are masked by the invocation of more formal sources of
authority.”). In the same article, Professor Zeppos noted that originalist interpretive theories
were based on “claims that fidelity to the enacting legislature is needed to counter anxiety
over judicial lawmaking” and that “[t]he new textualism seeks to eliminate nontextual
sources of authority from judicial consideration, also with the goal of constraining the
judge.” Id. at 1074. However, Professor Zeppos contrasted these views with those of scholars and judges advocating for “dynamic” interpretation methods do not necessarily see judicial lawmaking as an improper end of interpretation. Id. at 1088. But see SCALIA & GARNER,
supra note 2, at 5, for the contention that, in contrast to the decision-making process in
common law cases, “good judges dealing with statutes do not make law. They do not ‘give
new content’ to the statute, but merely apply the content that has been there all along, awaiting application to myriad factual scenarios.” Scalia and Garner lament that some judges have
accepted the invitation to make law improperly under the guise of statutory interpretation.
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 2, at 7.
2
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in denouncing judicial intrusion into the policy and lawmaking realm of legislatures. Textualism emphasizes the determination of statutory meaning based on
the ordinary meaning of a statute’s text; it rejects attempts to circumvent or
even supplement the apparent meaning of statutory text through inquiries into
the enacting legislature’s intention or purpose.4 For textualists, statutes simply
mean what they say.
Scholars have thoroughly documented a strong textualist shift within the
Supreme Court over the last few decades.5 In light of textualism’s profound influence, judges are highly attuned to the separation of powers concerns underlying the doctrine’s efforts to restrict judicial interference with the legislative
role. Yet, the gap between what judges do and what they say they do has, perhaps ironically, only grown with the popularity of textualism as a statutory interpretation method. At first blush, the contention that textualism has widened
the gap between what judges do and what they purport to do seems counterintuitive. One of textualism’s explicit goals is to restrict improper judicial lawmaking.6 If textualism has been so successful, there should be less (improper) lawmaking in the first place; therefore, any need to conceal it should likewise have
diminished.
To shed light on this paradox, another phenomenon must be examined in
tandem with the rise of textualism: the declining acceptance of the absurdity
doctrine.7 The absurdity doctrine is a canon of statutory interpretation holding
that a statute’s apparent ordinary meaning may be disregarded if the results of
its application are (in some sense)8 absurd. The conflicts between textualism
4

See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 2, at 16–17.
See, e.g., Jonathan R. Siegel, The Inexorable Radicalization of Textualism, 158 U. PA. L.
REV. 117, 119 (2009).
6 As Professor Jonathan Molot has noted, two key inquiries shape the debate over the proper
scope of the judicial role: (1) the nature of law itself, including “whether judicial leeway is
considered narrow or broad” and (2) “prevailing views . . . of the constitutional structure
and, specifically, on whether judges are viewed as ‘faithful agents’ or ‘coequal partners’ of
Congress.” Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 6
(2006). Professor Molot traces the history of modern textualism through these lenses and
describes how modern textualism arose from the desire to minimize judicial leeway in interpretation, coupled with an emphasis on the constitutional structure grounded in the separation of powers, and requiring bicameralism and presentment. See id. at 16, 23–27 (“Indeed,
textualism is best understood as one of a series of responses to this newfound appreciation of
interpretive leeway and of the judiciary’s limited role in the constitutional structure.”). I use
the phrase “improper judicial lawmaking” to refer to the proper scope of judicial power as
conceived of by textualists. Textualism’s success is, in large part, attributable to its proponents’ ability to persuade others of the legitimacy of this view of the judicial role. See id. at
29–31.
7 Even the most avowed textualists continue to accept at least some version of the absurdity
doctrine. See, e.g., SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 2, at 234 (including a section on the absurdity doctrine as an appropriate canon of statutory interpretation). The “decline” I have
referenced is with respect to the willingness of judges to employ the doctrine, not in their
overall acceptance of the doctrine’s appropriateness in some instances. This decline is examined in further detail in infra Part I.
8 The precise scope of the absurdity doctrine remains unsettled. See infra Section I.B.
5
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and at least some iterations of the absurdity doctrine have been well documented in the literature.9 Modern judges typically eschew all but the most narrow
versions of the absurdity doctrine, requiring a statute’s plain meaning to be patently illogical or insensible in order to justify applying the doctrine.10 Otherwise, they contend, the judiciary risks overstepping its constitutional limitations
by ignoring plain meaning11 where it entails an outcome seemingly contrary to
the overall statutory purpose or policy. Absurdity’s willingness to subvert a
statute’s clear meaning to avoid an undesirable result obviously clashes with
textualism’s admonitions regarding the dangers of results-oriented decisionmaking. Yet, as scholars have pointed out, textualism essentially requires some
version of the absurdity doctrine in order to avoid truly untenable interpretations or applications of apparently clear statutes.
Textualism’s combination of textual primacy and strict limits on the use of
the absurdity doctrine significantly constrain judges’ discretion to look beyond
a statute’s text during the interpretive process in order to achieve results
thought by a judge to be fair, consistent with statutory purpose, or consistent
with legislative intent. However, textualism’s success12 has had an unintended
and potentially counterproductive consequence. Judges, wary of appearing
overly “results-oriented” by liberally applying the absurdity doctrine, have
seized upon an interpretive rule with broader acceptance that ultimately permits
them to achieve the same result: ambiguity.
Once a statute is determined to be ambiguous, even textualists generally
consult a much broader range of sources as interpretive aids than would other-

9

See infra Part I.
See generally SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 2, at 234.
11 Throughout this article, I use the terms “plain meaning” and “ordinary meaning” interchangeably, consistent with the usage of many modern courts and scholars. See Linda D.
Jellum, But That is Absurd! Why Specific Absurdity Undermines Textualism, 76 BROOK. L.
REV. 917, 921 n.23 (2011). However, some scholars distinguish between ordinary meaning
and plain meaning, typically attributing a search for ordinary meaning to “modern” or “new”
textualists, while using plain meaning to distinguish earlier approaches to interpretation that
lacked the modern emphasis on context and linguistic use conventions. See, e.g., Lawrence
M. Solan, The New Textualists’ New Text, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 2027, 2030–32 (2005).
12 Here, I refer to success in terms of influence: “Textualists have spent three decades convincing judges of all political stripes to come along for the ride, and have had enormous success in establishing ‘text-first’ interpretation as the general norm.” See Abbe R. Gluck, Symposium: The Grant in King—Obamacare Subsidies as Textualism’s Big Test, SCOTUSBLOG
(Nov. 7, 2014, 12:48 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/11/symposium-the-grant-in-kin
g-obamacare-subsidies-as-textualisms-big-test/ [https://perma.cc/VF4E-QAZG]; see also
Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q.
351, 353–57 (1994) (reviewing existing and offering new contributions to the empirical evidence of textualism’s influence and concluding that “there can be no doubt that textualism
has asserted a powerful hold over the Supreme Court’s statutory interpretation jurisprudence”). While there has been ongoing, strenuous debate over textualism’s legitimacy since
the doctrine’s inception, even its detractors acknowledge its pervasive influence on interpretation in judicial practice and in the academic literature.
10
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wise be permissible.13 Thus, if the “hurdle” of ambiguity can be overcome,
judges are afforded greater discretion than they would be if hampered by a
finding of plain meaning—which, given the current narrow version of the absurdity doctrine, must be applied absent extreme circumstances. The rise of textualism and decline of the absurdity doctrine have created an incentive for
judges to find that the language of a statute is ambiguous. By so doing, I will
argue, courts are able to achieve results virtually identical to those possible if a
judge determined that a statute’s meaning was plain and then proceeded to apply some version of the absurdity doctrine. At the same time, by framing their
decisions in linguistic, rather than policy considerations, judges minimize the
appearance of acting outside the judicial role. Statutory purpose, policy goals,
and outcomes can all be considered; contradictory text is supplanted even as its
preeminence is exalted. Thus, I refer to this phenomenon as “absurdity in disguise.”14
This article explores how the confluence of modern versions of textualism
and the absurdity doctrine contributed to the jurisprudential shift I call absurdity in disguise. In Part I, I describe the uncomfortable fit between textualism and
the absurdity doctrine in further detail, outlining their conflicting justifications
and policies. In Part II, I describe the phenomenon of absurdity in disguise and
explain how the creation of statutory ambiguity enables judges to obtain the
same results as if the absurdity doctrine were openly applied. In Part III, I discuss several recent cases in which absurdity in disguise can be observed. The
cases involve statutes displaying classic symptoms of absurdity, including statutes that appear to be too broad or too narrow for their applications to be consistent with the statute’s likely intended reach.
I.

THE TENSION BETWEEN TEXTUALISM AND THE ABSURDITY DOCTRINE

Even avowedly textualist judges generally accept at least some version of
the absurdity doctrine as an appropriate tool of statutory construction.15 However, modern textualists strictly circumscribe the doctrine’s use.16 Below, in
Section I.A, I summarize the basic contours of textualism as an approach to
statutory interpretation. Section I.B outlines the absurdity doctrine and the welldocumented conflict between its focus on the results of statutory application
and textualist theories of statutory interpretation.
13

See infra Part II.
It should be noted at the outset that the emerging jurisprudential shift discussed here has
been noted in recent scholarship and other commentary. However, much of the existing literature identifies this shift with an outright rejection of textualism, or at least a moderation of
textualism, in favor of purposivism.
15 See, e.g., SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 2, at 234 (including a section on the absurdity
doctrine as an appropriate canon of statutory interpretation); see also Andrew S. Gold, Absurd Results, Scrivener’s Errors, and Statutory Interpretation, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 25 (2006);
John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387 (2003).
16 See, e.g., Manning, supra note 15.
14
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A. Textualist Interpretation and Textualism’s Rise
Although certainly not immune from controversy, textualism has had a
marked and incontrovertible impact on the theory and practice of statutory interpretation.17 Though many of the Supreme Court justices serving after the advent of textualism might reject the textualist label, the Court has made clear
that statutory text is to predominate in the search for meaning: “Our task is to
construe what Congress has enacted. We begin, as always, with the language of
the statute.”18 Textualism’s broad influence in the courts has been documented
by scholars19 and acknowledged by judges themselves: in a 2015 lecture at
Harvard Law School, Supreme Court Justice Elena Kagan asserted, “ ‘we’re all
textualists now.’ ”20
As an approach to statutory interpretation, textualism seeks to determine a
text’s “ordinary” or “plain” meaning, based on the meaning that a reasonable
reader of the language would have ascribed to the text at the time it was enacted into law.21 Early textualist doctrine differed markedly from what is commonly described as “modern” or “new” textualism. Specifically, earlier textualists tended to focus on statutes’ literal (or, arguably, hyper-literal) meaning.
This rigid approach was the root of the idea of “plain meaning.” Early courts
17

See, e.g., Molot, supra note 6, at 31; Gluck, supra note 12.
Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 172 (2001) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420,
431 (2000); Pub. Emp. Ret. Sys. of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 175 (1989); Watt v. Energy
Action Ed. Found., 454 U.S. 151, 162 (1981)). In another case, the Court noted, “As we have
repeatedly held, the authoritative statement is the statutory text, not the legislative history or
any other extrinsic material.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546,
568 (2005).
19 See, e.g., Molot, supra note 6, at 3, 32–34 (noting that “textualism has so succeeded in
discrediting strong purposivism that it has led even nonadherents to give great weight to
statutory text” and citing empirical and anecdotal evidence in support).
20 See Richard M. Re, Justice Kagan on Textualism’s Success, PRAWFSBLAWG (Dec. 7,
2015, 8:00 AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2015/12/justice-kagan-on-textu
alisms-victory.html [https://perma.cc/NW63-7YJ9].
21 See LINDA D. JELLUM, MASTERING STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 27–28 (2d ed. 2013);
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 2, at 69; Abner S. Greene, The Missing Step of Textualism, 74
FORDHAM L. REV. 1913, 1916 (2006); Manning, supra note 15, at 2396. Textualists will,
however, apply technical meanings to statutory terms if the context indicates a word is used
as a “term of art.” SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 2, at 76. In Reading Law, Justice Antonin
Scalia and Bryan A. Garner’s exposition of Justice Scalia’s textualism, the authors call this
approach the “fair reading method.” Id. at 33. Professor John F. Manning, a noted textualist
scholar, attributes this conception of plain meaning to “modern” textualism, in contrast with
older textual theories claiming that plain meaning referred to situations where statutory text
was so clear that interpretation was unnecessary. Manning, supra note 15, at 2396. As Justice Scalia was textualism’s most prominent adherent, I describe the ordinary meaning inquiry in the terms he and coauthor Bryan Garner offered in Reading Law. However, textualist interpretation need not conform to this approach, which fixes meaning at the time it was
enacted by a legislature. Alternatively, meaning could be ascribed in light of how a reasonable reader would currently interpret statutory text, making meaning “dynamic” as it shifts
over time. For a short overview of the controversy over static versus dynamic statutory
meaning and citations to relevant literature, see Molot, supra note 6, at 31 n.133–34.
18
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frequently referenced the lack of any need for interpretation where statutory
language was plain, viewing application as automatic in those instances.22
Modern textualists, in contrast, reject the proposition that interpretation is
unnecessary in some instances: “Every application of a text to particular circumstances entails interpretation.”23 Modern textualists recognize that language
is a social construct, drawing on work in philosophy of language originating
with Wittgenstein.24 Here, the inquiry shifts from the purely definitional to one
of conventional and accepted social use.25 Moreover, modern textualists emphasize that meaning is shaped by context and the many background assumptions shared by speakers and listeners.26 Hence, some scholars employ the term
“ordinary meaning” to distinguish the inquiry of modern textualists from that of
the earlier “literalist” textualists.27 As John Manning has argued, this more holistic, contextual version of textualism significantly reduces the need to resort
to fail-safes such as the absurdity doctrine.28
Thus, for modern textualists, common understandings and the linguistic
usage conventions of statutory terms are of paramount concern.29 The approach
is portrayed by its proponents as a positive (objective, descriptive) enterprise,
grounded in linguistic, social, and historical analysis.30 Textualism can be con22

See, e.g., Molot, supra note 6, at 34–35.
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 2, at 53.
24 Manning, supra note 15, at 2396.
25 See Solan, supra note 11, at 2030 (contrasting “plain meaning, as found in dictionary definitions” with “ordinary meaning,” which incorporates the context of a statement while still
being able to avoid resort to extratextual sources); see also Richard H. Fallon Jr., The Meaning of Legal “Meaning” and Its Implications for Theories of Legal Interpretation, 82 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1235, 1240 (2015).
26 Disagreements abound over which contextual factors and background assumptions are
appropriate for interpreters to consider. See, e.g., Greene, supra note 21.
27 See, e.g., JELLUM, supra note 21, at 27–28; Manning, supra note 15, at 2392; Solan, supra
note 11.
28 See Manning, supra note 15, at 2455 (arguing that modern textualism retains “substantial
means to address many of the problems traditionally handled by the absurdity doctrine” in
part because of its emphasis on “the context-dependent meaning of texts” rather than a focus
on “literal statutory interpretation”) (emphasis in original).
29 Id. at 2396 n.29.
30 See SCALIA AND GARNER, supra note 2, at 33. Modern textualists generally recognize that
interpretation does require the exercise of judgment and may, for instance, require a choice
among competing interpretive canons. See, e.g., id. at xxix, 59 (acknowledging that
“[t]extualism will not relieve judges of all doubts and misgivings about their interpretations.
Judging is inherently difficult, and language notoriously slippery,” and that part of the judgment required entails evaluating and choosing among potentially competing canons of construction). However, textualists portray these exercises as grounded in linguistic norms and
historical inquiry—with the implication being that these criteria are more objective than judicial policy preferences (or a judge’s understanding of a legislature’s intentions or policy
goals). See Merrill, supra note 12, at 352, 354 (arguing that textualism’s “critical assumption
is that interpretation should be objective rather than subjective” in contrast with efforts to
discern legislative intent, but calling the empirical basis of Justice Scalia’s claim of objectivity “doubtful”). The textualist implication that the canons are less manipulable than any
other criteria has been criticized for decades. See, e.g., Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the
23
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trasted with intentionalism, under which a statute’s meaning is determined by
inquiring into what the legislature intended the statute to mean at the time it
was enacted.31 A third approach, purposivism, focuses on interpreting statutory
language consistent with the statute’s broader purposes or policy goals in light
of the problems the statute was enacted to rectify.32
One factor distinguishing the three approaches is the extent to which proponents of each are willing to venture into sources outside of the statutory text
to uncover evidence of a statute’s meaning.33 Textualists tend to be the most
restrictive of the three.34 For textualists, where a statute is unambiguous, its
plain or ordinary meaning is virtually the end of the matter.35 Textualists reject
the use of legislative history36 and other extratextual sources of statutory purTheory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401 (1950). But see Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller,
The Canons of Statutory Construction and Judicial Preferences, 45 VAND. L. REV. 647, 647–
48 (1992). Moreover, scholars have argued that even judges considering only text would retain significant discretion. Zeppos, supra note 3, at 1091.
31 See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 2, at xxvii. Professor Linda D. Jellum describes intentionalism as focusing on the “specific intent” of the legislators—i.e. what the legislators had
in mind with regard to the particular issue before the court. JELLUM, supra note 21, at 33–34.
In contrast, a legislature’s “general intent,” the legislature’s broader goal or overall purpose,
is sought by purposivists. Id. at 34.
32 See JELLUM, supra note 21, at 38–41. Purposivism lies at the heart of Hart and Sacks’ legal process school and emphasizes the reasonableness and coherence of the body of law as a
whole. See generally HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P.
Frickey eds., 1994).
33 See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, The Significance of Statutory Interpretive Methodologies, 82
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1971, 1973 (2007) (noting that textualism resolves “textual uncertainty[] without relying on extrinsic evidence such as legislative history” and that the theory itself “is broadly accepted as an interpretive methodology, the controversy is over its exclusivism”).
34 See generally id.; JELLUM, supra note 21, at 33–35; see also Greene, supra note 21, at
1924–25 (describing seven textualist arguments for cutting off “extratextual knowledge” including legislative history).
35 See, e.g., Cross, supra note 33, at 1972 (“Textualists argue that the meaning of a statute
can be discerned entirely from the words used in the law under consideration.”). The influence that this textualist proposition has had on the Supreme Court as a whole is evident in
Justice Thomas’ majority opinion in Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 461–62
(2002) (citations omitted) (quoting Conn. Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54
(1992)):
Our role is to interpret the language of the statute enacted by Congress. This statute does not
contain conflicting provisions or ambiguous language. Nor does it require a narrowing construction or application of any other canon or interpretative tool. “We have stated time and again that
courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what
it says there. When the words of a statute are unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the last:
‘judicial inquiry is complete.’ ”
36

See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 2, at 34. “As we have said, in a fair reading, purpose—
as a constituent of meaning—is to be derived exclusively from a text.” Id. Several scholars
including Professor Jellum have noted that textualists do not hold this view uniformly; some,
more “moderate” textualists would look to legislative history and other extrinsic sources.
JELLUM, supra note 21, at 28. However, under what she calls “strict” or “new” textualism,
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pose to supplement or alter clear statutory text.37 Modern judges favoring other
interpretive approaches frequently begin with the language of a statute, but
consider these and other extratextual sources appropriate indicators of meaning
to resolve statutory ambiguity.38
One primary justification textualists raise in support of their approach is
that its focus on ordinary meaning results in a more objective analysis than approaches that seek to determine a legislative body’s intentions or purposes.39
Textualists argue that ordinary meaning is far less malleable than legislative
intent or purpose, meaning that judges are properly more constrained in determining what a statute means and how it applies in a given case. Less malleability means that judges are less able to inject their own policy or outcome preferences into the interpretive inquiry; instead, textualists contend, such matters are
reserved to the province of the legislature consistent with separation of powers
and what Scalia and Garner call “pure textualism,” these sources are off-limits even where a
statute is ambiguous. Id. at 29–30; SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 2, at xxix. The role of legislative history was traditionally at the crux of arguments among textualists and proponents
of other approaches. However, Professor Manning and others have noted the development of
new avenues for debate, resulting to some extent in the diminishment of the centrality of the
legislative history issue. See, e.g., Molot, supra note 6, at 34–35 (using the example of legislative history to illustrate his argument that the differences between modern textualism and
purposivism are exaggerated); see also John F. Manning, Second-Generation Textualism, 98
CAL. L. REV. 1287, 1289–90 (2010) (noting that the major focus of what he refers to as “second-generation textualists” has shifted away from the general question of whether to use legislative history).
37 See Manning, supra note 36, at 1289–90. Professor Frank B. Cross has referred to those
textualists who reject the use of extrinsic evidence to supplement statutory language as
“strict textualists.” See Cross, supra note 33, at 1973. Professor Johnathan T. Molot has described such textualist approaches as “aggressive” textualism. See Molot, supra note 6, at 48.
As Professor Jellum has noted, however, textualists do not generally reject all sources outside the statutory text—for instance, textualists widely accept the use of dictionaries and employ a variety of canons of construction to resolve the meaning of statutory terms. JELLUM,
supra note 21, at 27.
38 Even some textualists may utilize legislative history when confronted with statutory ambiguity, although in a more circumscribed manner than the traditional use of legislative history to discern a legislature’s intent. In his majority opinion in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., Justice Kennedy noted that the court had “repeatedly held” that “the
authoritative statement is the statutory text, not the legislative history or any other extrinsic
material. Extrinsic materials have a role in statutory interpretation only to the extent they
shed a reliable light on the enacting Legislature’s understanding of otherwise ambiguous
terms.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005). However,
he went on to criticize the use of legislative history based on a variety of textualist arguments
and noted the disagreement among the Court regarding whether those problems warranted a
blanket refusal to consider legislative history under any circumstances. See id. at 568–69.
39 See, e.g., SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 2, at 4–10, 17–18. But see William N. Eskridge,
Jr., The New Textualism and Normative Canons, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 531, 533 (2013) (reviewing ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF
LEGAL TEXTS (2012)) (“Critics of the new textualism claim that its methodology is no more
constraining than a methodology that considers legislative history as an interpretive aid.”);
Greene, supra note 21, at 1928 (arguing that “insisting that judges look just at ordinary
meaning of statutory text (even in context), without seeking additional extratextual information about what the text means, can open a gaping hole for judicial willfulness.”).
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principles. This separation of powers justification is one of the foremost arguments raised in support of textualism.40 Additionally, more objective, predictable outcomes enhance the rule of law.41
Further, many textualists challenge the very existence of legislative intentions or coherent legislative purposes to uncover. This contention is grounded
in public choice and social choice theories, first proposed by economists to explain and describe legislative behavior and outcomes.42 Essentially, these theories portray legislation as the product of compromises among competing interest groups necessary to secure the votes required for a bill’s passage.43 As a
result of these compromises, legislation may not correspond precisely to an
overall purpose or policy goal.44 The qualities of the legislative process underlie textualists’ commitment: even where a statute’s ordinary meaning appears
anomalous, or inconsistent with the apparent purpose of the statute, textualists
nevertheless apply the statute as written.
Thus, textualism’s appeal rests largely on its purported ability to restrain
judicial discretion in the interpretation of statutes.45 Proponents argue that its
focus on the ordinary meaning of statutory text minimizes improper judicial
lawmaking through the creation of the statutory “gap[s] or imperfection[s]” referenced in the quoted passage at the beginning of this article.46 In theory, judg-

40

See Manning, supra note 15, at 2389 n.6.
See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 2, at 4, 6, 10, 17–18. “ ‘[I]t is not too much to say that
the preference for the rule of law over the rule of men depends upon the intellectual integrity
of interpretation.’ ” Id. at xxix (alteration in original) (quoting GARY L. MCDOWELL, Introduction to POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF INTERPRETATION
vii, vii (1990)).
42 See Manning, supra note 36, at 1292 (discussing interest group theory and social choice
theory as two aspects of the broader discipline of public choice); see also Manning, supra
note 15, at 2410–19.
43 See Manning, supra note 15, at 2410–19.
44 See id.
45 See Zeppos, supra note 3, at 1081 (“By limiting the courts to textual sources, textualism
seeks to eliminate value choice in judging: the text alone will dictate a result.”).
46 In his relatively early 1992 analysis of textualism as an emerging theory of interpretation,
Professor Zeppos summarized the textualist contention as follows:
41

Textualists argue that the potentially wide array of originalist sources (especially legislative history) gives judges the freedom to justify (and hide) any policy decision. Thus, originalism only
encourages judges to stray from their preferably narrow function of . . . enforcing the text of
laws enacted by the legislature.

Id. at 1086–87. Professor Zeppos defined “originalism”—which he characterized as the
dominant interpretive approach until the emergence of various criticisms such as textualism—as a method that “resolves interpretive questions in statutory cases by asking how the
enacting Congress would have decided the question.” Id. at 1078. Thus, the “originalism”
discussed here is consistent with what scholars typically now refer to as intentionalism. See,
e.g., JELLUM, supra note 21, at 35. Although some strands of purposivism might emphasize a
legislature’s actual, subjective purpose (perhaps contrasted with legislative intent as broad or
general policy goals rather than intended applications in specific cases), purposivism can
also be conceived of as a legal process-type stylized construction of the purpose that could
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es should have less room to supplant a legislature’s policy preferences with
their own in determining the meaning of statutory text.47 Legislative outcomes
are a matter of public policy; as such, their consideration is a matter for legislative debate and resolution and not the concern of the courts. Unless, of course,
the result of applying a statute’s ordinary meaning is absurd. For textualists, the
absurdity doctrine provides one of the only justifications for applying a statute
in a way that is inconsistent with the statute’s ordinary meaning.48
B. The Absurdity Doctrine
The absurdity doctrine permits courts to disregard or modify unambiguous
statutory text where the application of its apparent meaning would produce absurd results.49 A frequently cited example of absurdity is found in Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1309 v. Laidlaw Transit Service, Inc., in which the
Ninth Circuit interpreted the word “less” to mean “more” in a federal statute
whose plain language essentially created a waiting period, rather than a deadline, for filing an appeal.50 An underlying theme in absurdity cases is that the
apparently clear language of a statute can’t possibly mean what it says. Some
cases, like Amalgamated Transit, involve apparent error or mistake; here, the
absurdity doctrine overlaps significantly with the doctrine of scrivener’s error.51
Another frequent cause of statutory absurdity is statutory vagueness, particular-

be attributed to reasonable legislators pursuing reasonable goals. See Manning, supra note
15, at 2398–99.
47 See Zeppos, supra note 3, at 1086–87.
48 See generally Ryan D. Doerfler, The Scrivener’s Error, 110 NW. L. REV. 811 (2016) (noting that a related doctrine, scrivener’s error, is an additional justification for departing from
plain text).
49 Manning, supra note 15, at 2388. In what has become a classic statement on the doctrine,
the Supreme Court in United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 482, 487 (1868) held:
The common sense of man approves the judgment mentioned by Puffendorf, that the Bolognian
law which enacted, “that whoever drew blood in the streets should be punished with the utmost
severity,” did not extend to the surgeon who opened the vein of a person that fell down in the
street in a fit. The same common sense accepts the ruling, cited by Plowden, that the statute of
1st Edward II, which enacts that a prisoner who breaks prison shall be guilty of a felony, does
not extend to a prisoner who breaks out when the prison is on fire—“for he is not to be hanged
because he would not stay to be burnt.” And we think that a like common sense will sanction the
ruling we make, that the act of Congress which punishes the obstruction or retarding of the passage of the mail, or of its carrier, does not apply to a case of temporary detention of the mail
caused by the arrest of the carrier upon an indictment for murder.

Id. at 2388.
50 Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1309 v. Laidlaw Transit Servs., Inc., 435 F.3d 1140,
1145–46 (9th Cir. 2006).
51 See Manning, supra note 15, at 2459 n.265 (describing the doctrine of scrivener’s error as
“apparently a form of the absurdity doctrine”); see also Doerfler, supra note 48, at 816 (describing scrivener’s errors as cases where “the words of a legislative text diverge from what
Congress meant to say”).
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ly overbreadth.52 This may be a problem broadly or only with respect to application in specific instances.53
The precise scope of the absurdity doctrine remains unsettled. “Cases using
or referring to the principle do not define absurdity, nor do they specify the
kinds of situations where the principle should be applied.”54 A primary disagreement centers around the question of how absurd a result must be to justify
disregarding a statute’s ordinary meaning.55 Scholars have identified and evaluated various possible conceptions of the doctrine, ranging from “true” absurdity
as a matter of formal logic, to absurd in the sense that the result of applying a
statute as written offends our sense of justice or fairness.56 One prominent textualist scholar defines absurdity as “a version of strong intentionalism” because
of a common definition of an absurd result is one “so contrary to perceived social values that Congress could not have ‘intended’ it.”57
The doctrine’s usage has been traced to the very beginnings of the American Republic,58 and it “has been one of the few fixed points in the Court’s frequently shifting interpretive regimes.”59 In fact, the propriety of the doctrine’s
use under at least some circumstances is widely accepted, even among judges
who otherwise rarely advocate departure from unambiguous text.60 The doctrine’s scope, however, has vacillated significantly over time. The seminal case

52

A classic example of statutory overbreadth leading to an arguably absurd result is the case
of Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527 (1989). In that case, a Federal Rule
of Evidence purportedly applied to all “defendants,” not just civil defendants, which would
have prioritized civil defendants over civil plaintiffs in application, raising questions of constitutionality. See id. at 509–11. In Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion, he specifically invoked the absurdity doctrine: “We are confronted here with a statute which, if interpreted
literally, produces an absurd, and perhaps unconstitutional result.” Id. at 527 (Scalia, J., concurring). He found that interpreting “defendant” more narrowly to mean “criminal defendant” was an acceptable interpretation that did the “least violence” to the text. Id. at 529.
53 Professor Jellum described both Green and Holy Trinity Church as cases involving “general absurdity,” i.e. ones which are “absurd regardless of the particular situation before the
court.” Jellum, supra note 11, at 930. Both cases involve instances of arguable statutory
overbreadth. On the other hand, some cases she describes as instances of “specific absurdity”—i.e. those where “the applicable statutes are perfectly logical in the abstract, but [absurd
when] applied to the specific facts of the case before the court”—also involve arguable overbreadth. Id. at 932. For instance, a statute prohibiting escapes from prison is generally uncontroversial, but becomes problematic when a prisoner escapes in order to save himself
from a fire. The statute in that specific case seems broader than its intended reach. See id.
54 See Veronica M. Dougherty, Absurdity and the Limits of Literalism: Defining the Absurd
Result Principle in Statutory Interpretation, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 127, 128 (1994).
55 See id.
56 See id. at 140–41, 150–51.
57 Manning, supra note 15, at 2390; accord Gold, supra note 15, at 25–27.
58 See generally Manning, supra note 15.
59 See id. at 2389.
60 See id. at 2388–89; see also Dougherty, supra note 54, at 128.
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on the absurdity doctrine, the oft-maligned61 Holy Trinity Church v. United
States,62 perhaps marks the broadest conception of the doctrine.63 In that case,
the Supreme Court interpreted a provision of the Alien Contract Labor Act prohibiting bringing people from other countries to the United States “to perform
labor or service of any kind” not to apply to the services of a pastor brought into the country by the church.64 The Court (in)famously ruled that although the
pastor’s services fell within the letter of the law, “a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit nor
within the intention of its makers.”65
No matter one’s view of the wisdom of a statute broadly prohibiting the
importation of “laborers,” it is clear that the statute’s plain meaning does not
rise to the level of absurdity that textualists would require before disregarding
the text. The version of the absurdity doctrine accepted by Justice Scalia would
require both that the claimed absurdity “consist of a disposition that no reasonable person could intend” and that it “be reparable by changing or supplying a
particular word or phrase whose inclusion or omission was obviously a technical or ministerial error.”66 Not only is the hurdle envisioned “very high,” the
doctrine as envisioned here would categorically refuse to address “substantive
errors” arising as a result of the application of a statute to particular circumstances.67
Notably, Holy Trinity Church is alternatively described as exemplifying the
high point of the absurdity doctrine and the high point of purposivist interpretation more generally.68 This conceptual overlap is especially telling in light of
modern purposivists’ reluctance to subvert the import of apparently clear statutory text in favor of the purpose of the statute, even where the two directly conflict.69 Instead, modern purposivists generally delve into purpose only to clarify
statutory ambiguity. This limitation, another outgrowth of textualism’s rise in
popularity, has contributed to the erection of the ambiguity “hurdle” that stands

61

See Pub. Citizen v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 472–74 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Carol Chomsky, Unlocking the Mysteries of Holy Trinity: Spirit,
Letter, and History in Statutory Interpretation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 901, 905–06 (2000).
62 Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
63 See Jellum, supra note 11, at 925–26 (noting that Holy Trinity Church “expanded Kirby’s
narrow absurdity doctrine”).
64 Holy Trinity Church, 143 U.S. at 458.
65 Id. at 459.
66 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 2, at 237–38.
67 See id. In that sense, the doctrine here is effectively indistinguishable from the related
“scrivener’s error” canon.
68 See Manning, supra note 15, at 2403 (calling Holy Trinity Church one of the “classic[],”
“leading,” and “most influential” absurdity cases, while describing the absurdity doctrine as
a version of “strong intentionalism”); Molot, supra note 6, at 14 (describing the case as
“[t]he most famous, influential example of the Court’s bold purposivism in federal statutory
interpretation during [the] period . . . .”).
69 See John F. Manning, The New Purposivism, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 113, 113 (2011).
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in the way of fuller purposive or results-oriented inquiries and led to the phenomenon of ambiguity in disguise.
As noted, in contrast to Holy Trinity Church, more recent opinions of the
Court have endorsed substantially narrower iterations of the absurdity doctrine.
This modern conception of the absurdity doctrine goes beyond individual,
avowedly textualist justices such as Justice Scalia. In 2011, tracing the history
of the doctrine’s use, Professor Linda Jellum noted that the Supreme Court had
“explicitly relied on the absurdity doctrine only five times” since 1989.70 In a
majority opinion, the Supreme Court has described the doctrine as one to be
used only “rarely” and as a last resort.71 The Court has ruled that even the possibility of an “unintentional drafting gap” is insufficient to warrant judicial correction; correction is the province of Congress in cases where an admittedly
“anomalous” result “may seem odd, but . . . is not absurd.”72 It is not enough
that applying the unambiguous language lead to “counter-intuitive” results to
warrant the invocation of the absurdity doctrine.73
The Court’s hesitancy to employ the absurdity doctrine to disregard a statute’s plain language is likely attributable to the rise of textualism as an approach to statutory interpretation.74 This is unsurprising given the absurdity
doctrine’s close relationship with purposivism—to reject one is, in many respects, to reject the other. The following section identifies in further detail the
friction between textualism and the absurdity doctrine.
C. Textualism and the Absurdity Doctrine: In Tension at Best, Irreconcilable
at Worst
To reiterate, textualists maintain that their approach minimizes judicial policymaking; textualists focus solely on what a statute, as written, means, leaving
the question of whether its application is desirable to the domain of the legislature. Whether the outcome of applying a statute is “desirable” is, in many respects, a policy question of whether a statute should govern in certain circumstances. Averring that such policy decisions are the province of legislatures
rather than courts, textualists invoke separation of powers arguments to require
that, at least insofar as statutes are clear, they must be interpreted and applied as
70

Jellum, supra note 11, at 926.
See id. at 926–27 (quoting Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 441 (2002)).
72 Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 565 (2005). The Court also
noted in its holding that:
71

This is not a case where one can plausibly say that concerned legislators might not have realized
the possible effect of the text they were adopting. Certainly, any competent legislative aide who
studied the matter would have flagged this issue if it were a matter of importance to his or her
boss, especially in light of the Subcommittee Working Paper. There are any number of reasons
why legislators did not spend more time arguing over [the statute], none of which are relevant to
our interpretation of what the words of the statute mean.

Id. at 571.
73 See Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 459 (2002).
74 See Manning, supra note 69, at 113–14.
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written. The desirability of the results of applying statutes in specific cases is to
play no role in determining their meanings. Though modern textualism considers context, in this sense a strict separation is attempted between what statutory
language means and its import in application.
Herein lies the root of the conflict between textualism and the absurdity
doctrine.75 The absurdity doctrine is avowedly results-oriented; textualists generally reject consideration of such results as constitutionally problematic. Yet
even the most committed textualists acknowledge that results cannot be ignored
in every instance. As several scholars have thoroughly documented, the absurdity doctrine provides a sort of “fail-safe” for textualists in the event that their
commitment to the text becomes unacceptably unpalatable. But, as John Manning notes, “[i]f modern textualists perceive their methodology to be workable
only because of the availability of the absurdity doctrine, then one must question the conceptual foundations of textualism itself.”76 Linda Jellum made this
tension the focus of an entire article, contending that “absurdity and textualism
are simply incompatible; indeed, the absurdity doctrine undermines the very
foundation of textualism.”77 William Eskridge has made the point that if the absurdity doctrine is acceptable to textualists, there is no sound justification for
adhering to ordinary meaning even where a result seems merely unreasonable,
as opposed to patently absurd.78
Despite the apparent contradictions, however, early textualists evidently
applied the absurdity doctrine frequently—in tracing the doctrine’s development, Professor Jellum notes that it “was commonly used up until the 1940s as
a way to temper the sometimes harsh effects of the plain meaning canon in its
literalist formulation.”79 In a following intentionalist period, Professor Jellum
notes that “the plain meaning canon fell from favor; and thus, the absurdity
doctrine faded briefly into obscurity.”80 The advent of modern textualism—
which scholars frequently trace to at or near the time of Justice Scalia’s appointment to the Supreme Court81—renewed the utility of the absurdity doctrine.82 Yet, the modern Court has been far less willing to employ it, at the same

75

And perhaps, as noted above, between textualism and “strong” (i.e., not modern) purposivism.
76 Manning, supra note 15, at 2392.
77 Jellum, supra note 11, at 919.
78 See Manning, supra note 15, at 2411 (citing WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 26–27 (1994)).
79 Jellum, supra note 11, at 926.
80 Id.
81 See id. (tracing modern textualism to 1986, when Justice Scalia was appointed); Richard
J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court’s New Hypertextualism: An Invitation to Cacophony and
Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 750 (1995) (“During the
period 1982–1992, the Court decreased its use of intentionalism and increased its use of textualism.”).
82 See Jellum, supra note 11, at 926; Pierce, supra note 81, at 750.
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time that many of the justices feel obligated to pay homage to ordinary meaning.83
This is, no doubt, attributable in part to the important modifications to the
old plain meaning rule that modern textualists have made; the ordinary meaning inquiry is fuller and richer than the surface glance that characterized plain
meaning. Although the modern emphasis on social usage conventions is viewed
by textualists as an objective inquiry, none would deny that it is an inquiry—
the interpretive process is not automatic. Even unambiguous texts are viewed as
requiring analysis, placement within context, and deliberation. To the extent the
absurdity doctrine was required to remedy “hyper-literal” interpretations, it
may simply be less needed under modern textualism.
On the other hand, another explanation for the Court’s reluctance to rely on
absurdity is likely the justices’ intuition (consistent with the arguments made
by Professors Manning and Jellum, among others) that textualism84 itself is undermined by the need for the absurdity doctrine and the doctrine’s application.
Many of the core justifications underlying modern textualism seem to entail an
extremely high threshold for absurdity in order to justify disregarding a statute’s ordinary meaning. In particular, the arguments based on public and social
choice theory described in the previous section indicate that judges should be
extremely wary of potentially undermining the policy decisions of the legislature. Public and social choice theories theoretically normalize legislative outcomes that are “merely” odd, anomalous, ill-conceived, illogical, not ideal, or
even silly. Oddities may not be simple mistakes; instead, they might represent a
hard-won legislative compromise or crucial negotiated point. And, if the statutory scheme or body of law as a whole is not quite neat or coherent, that’s to be
expected, too—after all, we can’t expect rational outcomes in collective decision-making in the first place.85
Further, many of the formalist underpinnings of textualism come into play
at this point to counsel against judicial “correction” of less-than-absurd results,
through, for example, the imposition of legal process-type assumptions of “rea-

83

See Pierce, supra note 81, at 752.
Here, “textualism” is used largely as a shorthand and not to suggest that most Supreme
Court justices would self-identify as textualist or be overly concerned about undermining
“textualism” itself. Instead, the point here is that despite the controversy it engenders, textualism has notably influenced the Supreme Court’s approach to statutory interpretation. Much
of this influence is likely due to concerns over avoiding excess judicial discretion, maintaining separation of powers, and the like. Additionally, public and social choice theories, along
with the law and economics discipline broadly, have influenced the courts both jointly with
and independently of textualism. Cf. Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts:
1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039, 1039–40 (1997) (tracing the influence of interest
group theory and public choice theory in Supreme Court decision-making in a variety of
agency contexts). All of these factors contribute to both textualism’s rise and absurdity’s decline.
85 For John Manning’s discussion of social choice theory see Manning, supra note 15, at
2412–19.
84
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sonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes, reasonably.”86 Textualists argue
that the constitutional requirements of bicameralism and presentment preclude
judges from revising the text that was actually produced by Congress and approved by both Congress and the President. And, again, once it is accepted that
the legislative process may inherently produce anomalies—that these may be
“intended” (in some sense)87 rather than the result of inadequate foresight or
ineffective expression—commitment to legislative supremacy88 seems to mandate deference to the bargains struck.
Finally, the absurdity doctrine’s conceptual closeness with purposivism offers insight into the inverse paths of textualism and absurdity. The unabashed
consideration of outcomes in light of an enacting legislature’s likely (or perceived) purposes or goals (outside of those that are textually evident) is antithetical to textualist methods. For textualists, the danger is too great that in attempting to discern the legislature’s purpose and interpret statutes in
accordance with it, the judge’s personal views of the ideal policy outcomes will
ultimately prevail. Interpretation essentially takes place in one direction: the
statutory text is to shape the outcome of applying it in a given case. Purposivists do not interpret rigidly in one direction.89 For purposivists, an outcome that
is odd or counterintuitive in relation to a purpose the statute seems intended to
serve may indicate that a judge has misconstrued the statute and should reexamine the text. Notably, this broad version of purposivism does not require an
ambiguity finding, either ex ante or ex post. The consideration of outcome in
light of purpose is viewed as a proper inquiry into meaning regardless of the
existence of ambiguity.90 The absurdity doctrine echoes the two-direction fea86

See generally HART & SACKS, supra note 32, at 1374–78; see also JELLUM, supra note 21,
at 38–42.
87 Joseph Raz offered one conception of a more generalized legislative intent that depends
not on the specific, subjective intentions of legislators, but rather is based on the assumption
that the legislators broadly intended to enact the law as delineated by the statutory text. He
essentially argued this minimal sort of intent is necessary in order to establish the authority
of law. See Manning, supra note 15, at 2457 n.258.
88 Many debates among statutory interpretation “camps” revolve around which approach
best upholds the principle of legislative supremacy in the enterprise of making law. See, e.g.,
John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70, 91
(2006).
89 Molot, supra note 6, at 36–37 (arguing that “[t]extualists accuse purposivists of continuing to look to context after they have arrived at a clear textual meaning,” but contending that
this “alleged distinction . . . is not meaningful.”).
90 By way of analogy using textualist terms, consider the textualist distinction between “determining the ordinary meaning of the text” on the one hand and “resolving ambiguity” on
the other: some tools of construction are appropriate at either or both phases, while others
become permissible only if ambiguity is found ex ante and a judge must proceed to resolve
it. One key difference between textualism and purposivism may be that purposivists do not
draw this conceptual distinction, or at least find the distinction less significant in practice.
Even for textualists, the nature and scope of these two stages is not especially welldeveloped in the literature, and occasionally the two phases are conflated. However, there is
ample support for the existence of a division given that the use of certain canons and other
interpretive tools is consistently described as proper only to resolve ambiguous statues, while
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ture of purposivist interpretation, effectively eliminating the distinction between clear versus ambiguous text by treating clear text as if it were ambiguous. Thus, to the extent textualism relies on the absurdity doctrine as a fail-safe,
it admits the superiority of an opposing interpretive approach.91
The Supreme Court’s current conception of the absurdity doctrine shares
little in common with Holy Trinity Church’s unabashed elevation of the spirit
of the law over its text. As the Supreme Court’s interpretive jurisprudence increasingly incorporated textualist principles, its willingness to invoke the absurdity doctrine likewise decreased. In the absence of extreme circumstances,
textualist-influenced courts cannot overtly invoke the modern absurdity doctrine either to avoid interpretations of unambiguous statutory text that seem inconsistent with the statute’s broad purpose or goals, or to avoid applying a statute according to its clear terms where the result seems merely incongruous,
unexpected, or just plain odd.92
II. ABSURDITY IN DISGUISE: THE ROLE OF AMBIGUITY
The increasing acceptance of textualist interpretive approaches has curtailed the acceptable uses of the absurdity doctrine. Yet, regardless of what
method of statutory interpretation judges employ, they are inevitably faced with
the task of interpreting and applying statutory text to resolve actual disputes
with significant legal and policy consequences. The implications of doing so
cannot be entirely lost on judges, even for those who make every effort to remain apolitical and faithful to the judicial role. Whether a judge intentionally or
unconsciously seeks to disguise a results-oriented interpretation, the results of
particular interpretations have the potential to impact interpretive decisions.
Given textualists’ frequent admonition that their theory is necessary in part because of the concern that judges will otherwise fail to restrain the impulse to
interpret statutes to achieve a desired result, it would certainly be difficult for
textualists to contend that this temptation does not exist.
The confluence of this inevitable temptation and the restrictions of textualist doctrine has created the somewhat perverse incentive for judges to conceal
or obfuscate outcome-sensitive reasoning as the basis for judicial decisions.
Less-accepted doctrines, such as broad versions of the absurdity doctrine, must
at the same time the determination of ordinary meaning is described as a process of contextual analysis and may include sources of meaning such as dictionaries even where text is ultimately determined to be unambiguous. Unlike the old plain meaning rule, then, a statute’s
meaning need not be immediately and automatically crystal clear in order to be unambiguous. Thus, the potential for two separate inquiries to occur (i.e., an unsuccessful initial attempt to determine the text’s ordinary meaning resulting in an ambiguity finding, followed
by the resolution of the ambiguity) is implicit in textualist doctrine.
91 See Jellum, supra note 11, at 938.
92 And, because even modern purposivists purport to prioritize clear text, taking an explicitly non-textualist approach is no longer a viable option either, short of significantly overhauling a significant amount of language in the Supreme Court’s interpretation jurisprudence
emphasizing the primacy of statutory text.
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be pursued under cover of more widely accepted interpretive doctrines. Here,
then, is the root of absurdity in disguise. Whether consciously or not, judges
have had to seize on less controversial rules of interpretation as vehicles for
pursuing certain results in particular cases. Ambiguity fits the bill.93
An ambiguity finding opens the door to a wealth of interpretive tools that
would not be available without it. Crucially, all textualists—even strict textualists—authorize the use of a much broader array of sources of meaning in cases
where the text is found to be ambiguous.94 While “strict” textualists, like Justice Scalia, would continue to eschew legislative history even to resolve ambiguity, other textualists would permit its use.95 But other sources are permitted
by even “pure” textualists. For instance, while Justice Scalia would not permit
the use of headings and titles in statutes to override an apparently conflicting,
but clear provision in the statutory text, he would permit the use of headings
and titles to clarify ambiguous statutory text.96 Other examples abound, including not only a variety of text-based canons, but also substantive canons like the
constitutional avoidance canon97 and the rule of lenity.98
93

Even with modern textualists’ emphasis on ordinary meaning in context, instances still
arise where either multiple reasonable possibilities exist as to meaning, or the meaning is
simply not clear without further information. As noted, even modern textualists’ holistic,
contextual prescriptions for the determination of ordinary meaning do not preclude ambiguity findings in some instances. Thus, the question of ambiguity’s existence is uncontroversial.
See Molot, supra note 6, at 35 (noting that “even the most committed textualists have openly
acknowledged that text can be ambiguous . . .”). However, the frequency of ambiguity findings by textualists versus purposivists has been criticized. See Merrill supra note 12, at 354
(arguing that textualist judges are more likely than other judges to determine that statutes are
unambiguous and that this tendency is excessive and problematic).
94
See Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50, 67 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“If the text were clear, resort to anything else would be unwarranted . . . But I agree
with the Court that [it] is ambiguous . . . .”); see also JELLUM, supra note 21, at 28–29.
95 See JELLUM, supra note 21, at 27–30.
96 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 2, at 221–22.
97 Professor Jellum describes the constitutional avoidance canon as another method, along
with the absurdity doctrine, of avoiding the ordinary meaning of statutory text. JELLUM, supra note 21, at 96–98. However, the avoidance doctrine was traditionally invoked as a way
of resolving preexisting ambiguity. Id. at 96. Another scholar, Eric S. Fish, has contrasted
the two conceptions and identified examples in recent caselaw. See Eric S. Fish, Constitutional Avoidance as Interpretation and as Remedy, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1275, 1275–78
(2016). He describes Jellum’s conception as a contemporary use of the avoidance doctrine
that more closely resembles remedy, rather than an interpretive canon, and defends its use as
a separate doctrine from the original canon. See id. at 1279–80. I contend that this “contemporary” avoidance is but one iteration of the broader phenomenon of absurdity in disguise.
After all, that Congress might enact a law of questionable constitutionality is not narrowly
absurd in the sense of being truly illogical or inconceivable—meaning that it cannot be
overtly brought under the now-narrowed absurdity doctrine. Further, the proposition that
Congress could not have intended to violate the constitution is not coterminous with the
proposition that Congress could not have intended to enact the law that it did in the language
that it used—and textualists, who reject considerations of the results of applying a statute,
would be concerned only with the latter proposition even in absurdity cases. According to
Justice Scalia-esque textualists, the proper inquiry would focus on whether it is absurd to
imagine that Congress intended to enact the very language that it did. Yet, at the same time,
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An important point to emphasize is that ambiguity opens the door to additional sources of statutory meaning when the ambiguity finding is made ex ante
(i.e., at the outset of the interpretive process). Traditionally, if an ambiguity
finding is not made at the outset, sources beyond ordinary meaning cannot be
consulted.99 “Many tenets of statutory interpretation take a peculiar form. They
allow consideration of outside information—legislative history, practical consequences, the statute’s title, etc.—but only if the statute’s text is unclear or
ambiguous.”100
In contrast, as described in the previous section, the absurdity doctrine essentially allows a court to treat clear text as if it were ambiguous, opening the
door to a broad array of interpretive tools that would otherwise not be available.
When the absurdity doctrine is applied, a court may adopt a less natural reading
of the statute that avoids the problematic results of applying the statute’s most
obvious or ordinary meaning. This may involve narrowing or qualifying overbroad terms in a statute, creating exceptions, extending the statute beyond its
apparent reach, or adopting an uncommon or unusual usage as the definition of
a statutory term (among other things). Whether statutory text is actually ambiguous or merely treated as such, the constraints of the plain meaning canon are
removed: ipso facto, there is no plain meaning to apply.
For textualists, ambiguity is less controversial than the absurdity doctrine
for a variety of reasons. Perhaps most significantly, ambiguity is viewed as a
purely linguistic phenomenon rather than as a question of policy preference.
Ambiguity can even be differentiated from textual canons of interpretation like
the rule against surplusage, which instructs that wherever possible statutes

it would certainly strike many as more than odd to imagine that Congress intended to enact
an unconstitutional law. This tension reflects the continuum of definitions of absurdity—an
unconstitutional ordinary meaning is appropriately conceptualized as one type of absurdity
falling below the threshold necessary to fall within the modern absurdity doctrine’s narrow
reach.
98 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 2, at 296–302.
99 For instance, see the Supreme Court’s decision in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs.,
Inc.:
The proponents of the alternative view of § 1367 insist that the statute is at least ambiguous and
that we should look to other interpretive tools, including the legislative history of § 1367, which
supposedly demonstrate Congress did not intend § 1367 to overrule Zahn. We can reject this argument at the very outset simply because § 1367 is not ambiguous.

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 567 (2005). The implication
here is that without the ambiguity finding in advance, it would be inappropriate to consider
legislative history. Whatever might be found in the legislative history cannot be permitted to
impact the interpretation of clear text. See Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S.
50, 67 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring) (citations omitted) (“If the text in this case were
clear, resort to anything else would be unwarranted. But I agree with the Court that [it] is
ambiguous . . . .”); JELLUM, supra note 21, at 28.
100 William Baude & Ryan D. Doerfler, The (Not So) Plain Meaning Rule, 84 U. CHI. L.
REV. 539, 540 (2017).

19 NEV. L.J. 741, DOVE

Spring 2019]

5/27/2019 4:23 PM

ABSURDITY IN DISGUISE

761

should be interpreted to avoid rendering a provision inoperative.101 Whereas the
latter doctrine is justified by the claim that it reflects typical usage conventions
employed by average speakers (here, avoiding redundancy), ambiguity effectively justifies the need to resolve it by its very existence. Any problem with
the clarity of statutory language must necessarily be resolved as a part of the
process of interpretation. Otherwise, by definition, there is no meaning—plain,
ordinary, or in any other sense—to apply. Whatever controversy exists over
what interpretation properly entails, resolving ambiguity is indisputably a necessary component.
This insight, although self-evident, is actually quite significant. Ambiguity
is invariably, and for the most part uncontrovertibly, viewed as interpretation
in a positive sense. In other words, even the use of textual canons that purport
to reflect typical usage conventions is normative in the sense that to employ
them as some textualists do is to assert, inter alia, (1) that the ordinary meaning
of text based on general usage constitutes the meaning of the text in the sense
that is relevant for statutory interpretation, (2) that the textual canons accurately
reflect usage conventions in the relevant linguistic community (or that they do
so frequently enough to be useful), and so on.102 Ambiguity is least associated
with judicial “construction”—the view of some scholars of interpretation that a
separate process beyond interpretation exists in which judges must venture beyond linguistic analysis in order to give meaning to statutory text. 103 The concept, and even the existence, of a separate step of statutory “construction” has
been hotly debated, likely because it suggests a degree of judicial lawmaking.104 Interpretation, on the other hand, is more broadly viewed as fully within
the proper judicial role. Thus, ambiguity fits most comfortably within the limited scope of judicial decision-making that textualist judges espouse and with
which judges in general are likely most comfortable.

101

See Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton, 137 S. Ct. 1652, 1659 (2017) (explaining that the surplusage canon presumes “that each word Congress uses is there for a reason.”). These canons, too, are closely related to ambiguity in that they may be employed to
resolve ambiguous statutory text. In fact, authority can be found for the proposition that canons such as these are only to be utilized once statutory text has been found to be ambiguous.
On the other hand, these canons are sometimes used without an explicit (and sometimes even
without an implicit) finding of ambiguity; instead, it appears as though they are being employed as part of the determination of the ordinary meaning of text. Given that ordinary
meaning is largely by the ordinary use of terms found in statutes, the latter approach makes
some sense for linguistic canons such as those mentioned here.
102 Even proponents of the canons’ use acknowledge that they will conflict in some instances, necessitating a normative judgment as to which should be employed. Cf. SCALIA &
GARNER, supra note 2, at 33 (indicating how some canons only apply to ambiguous terms
and others to vague terms).
103 See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST.
COMMENT. 95, 95–96 (2010).
104 See, e.g., SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 2, at 13–14.
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Further, because ambiguity is viewed as a problem inherent in the text itself,105 the source of the problem is the unclear or inadequate expression by the
legislature which drafted the text. Placing the source of the problem squarely
on the legislature’s expression contributes to the perception of ambiguity as
solely a textual, as opposed to “substantive” doctrine. Unlike the absurdity doctrine, the justification for employing tools to resolve ambiguity is nonconsequentialist.106 Here, perhaps, is one of the key distinctions between ambiguity and absurdity (and a key explanation for why the former canon is far less
controversial): to invoke the absurdity doctrine, a judge must consider the result
of applying clear statutory text and determine that this result is a problem. The
problem arises during the fundamentally judicial process of interpreting statutes
and applying them in specific cases. In cases involving ambiguity, judges can
argue that they cannot even begin to engage in this judicial process without first
resolving the problem of unclear drafting, which arose as part of the legislative
process. It is far easier to avoid the charge that judges inject their own policy
preferences into the interpretive process when the problem at issue is viewed as
one originating outside the judicial process, but simultaneously squarely within
the judicial role to resolve.
The perception of ambiguity as solely a function of language, and not dependent on legislative policy choices107 or judicial policy preferences, lends
courts’ efforts to resolve it an air of objectivity that contributes significantly to
its broad acceptance within the judicial role. On the one hand, it would be difficult to imagine a scholar of linguistics contending that the determination of
meaning is a simple, purely objective affair. Linguistics, like any scholarly
field, is rife with controversy over a number of questions involving the meaning of language.108 That said, the conventional (or “lay”) use of linguistic ter-

105

The thesis of this paper is that in many situations where ambiguity is found, it is actually
“created” by the problematic result of applying text that is, in actuality, clear. I also note later in this section that the conflation of the concepts of ambiguity and vagueness frequently
results in ambiguity findings where true ambiguity is not present. The proposition here is
thus intended to express a common perception of ambiguity that contributes to its broad acceptance and “reputation” for objectivity; I do not assert this as a fact about ambiguity findings in practice.
106 Of course, any interpretive method or tool is consequentialist in the sense that the interpretive enterprise as a whole seeks to determine the meaning of statutory text. However, ambiguity need not (but, of course, may) be resolved with an eye toward the outcome of the
decision. In contrast, the absurdity doctrine is implicated solely because of an undesirable
outcome and applied with the explicit goal of avoiding that outcome in favor of a preferred
one.
107

True ambiguity is almost always the result of carelessness or inattention. It is rarely intentional—though there are certainly instances of statutory or contractual ambiguity in which each side,
fully aware of the ambiguity, embraces it in the hope or belief that its version of meaning will
ultimately prevail.

SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 2, at 32.
108 See, e.g., LAURIE BAUER, BEGINNING LINGUISTICS 11–12 (2012). As one simple example,
the word “happen” has two meanings: “Did you happen to see the accident happen?” Id. at
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minology such as “semantics” suggests a technical, literal meaning. While
many prominent textualists, for instance, reject the characterization of their approach as overly literal (or semantic in its most negative, lay connotation), they
do benefit in a way from this perception because it suggests a relatively objective, almost scientific approach to the determination of statutory meaning.
Moreover, typical examples of linguistic ambiguity given in the statutory
interpretation context include simple examples based on homonymous words
whose meanings are easily resolved within proper context.109 This may give the
(likely misleading) impression that resolving ambiguity is simply a matter of
examining the context of a term to determine the sense in which it is used.
While most textualists would likely agree that, in practice, ambiguity is not
necessarily so simplistic, the frequent use of simple examples to illustrate the
concept is another factor that contributes to the perception that ambiguity is
purely a matter of linguistics or language—implying its existence is unrelated
to policy judgments or outcome considerations.110
Another explanation for the appeal of ambiguity is its malleability. The
problem of defining statutory ambiguity has been widely addressed in the literature.111 As a number of scholars have noted, ambiguity could refer only to situations where statutory text suggests two (or more) “equally plausible” meanings.112 This would be a more significant hurdle for an ambiguity finding than,
for instance, a standard providing that a statute is ambiguous if reasonable people could disagree as to its meaning.113 A very broad definition of ambiguity
could provide that a statute is ambiguous if it has two or more possible meanings.114 And, of course, courts may determine a statute is ambiguous without
explicitly offering a definition of ambiguity. Moreover, the difficulty of drawing the line between clear and ambiguous text is not confined to one interpre-

13. Linguists debate whether “happen” is one word with two meanings, exhibiting the quality of polysemy, or two words that are homonyms. See id. at 14.
109 Take, for instance, the common example of “bay,” which could mean a horse or a geographic feature depending on the context. See Bay, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/bay [https://perma.cc/68TS-DC6K] (last visited Jan. 21, 2019).
110 The thesis of this paper is that ambiguity, in practice, has been found to exist as a result
of policy preferences or considerations regarding the outcome of applying apparently clear
statutory language. The proposition here is simply that the common perception of ambiguity
is that it is not the result of such preferences, and is purely a linguistic phenomenon.
111 See Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118,
2134–40 (2016) (reviewing ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (2014)); Lawrence
M. Solan, Pernicious Ambiguity in Contracts and Statutes, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 859 (2004)
(“[T]he concept of ambiguity is itself perniciously ambiguous. People do not always use the
term in the same way, and the differences often appear to go unnoticed.”).
112 See, e.g., JELLUM, supra note 21, at 88 (quoting LINDA D. JELLUM & DAVID C. HRICIK,
MODERN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: PROBLEMS, THEORIES, AND LAWYERING STRATEGIES
94 (2d ed. 2009)).
113 See id.
114 See id. at 87.
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tive approach and does not appear to impact judicial decision-making within
interpretive approaches in a consistent way.115
Further, ambiguity is amenable to the exercise of judicial discretion because of its frequent conflation with the related concepts of vagueness. While
legal scholars and philosophers of language regularly distinguish the concepts
of ambiguity and vagueness, this line is not commonly drawn in judicial opinions.116 While ambiguity refers to a situation where language is subject to varying interpretations because it can be understood in two or more different senses,
vagueness occurs where the scope or extent of what a term refers to is unclear
or indeterminate.117 While an ambiguous term could arguably denote two completely different things—“bay” as a horse or as a water feature—a vague term
typically denotes similar things, but to an unclear extent.118 Thus, in Hart’s
classic problem of the prohibition of vehicles in the park, the term vehicles may
or may not include bicycles, skateboards, or strollers.119 This factor may be one
of the most significant in terms of explaining the phenomenon of ambiguity in
disguise: the ability to invoke policy to narrow statutory text or to create exceptions without invoking the criticism of judicial overreach is bolstered by the
conflation of vagueness with the linguistic concept of ambiguity.
Before turning to the cases that I view as exhibiting absurdity in disguise, a
further word on the relationship between the absurdity doctrine and purposivism is in order. Professor Richard M. Re previously identified the connection
between Holy Trinity Church and three of the cases discussed below120: King v.
Burwell,121 Bond v. United States,122 and Yates v. United States.123 His article
characterizes the Supreme Court’s interpretive approach in these cases, which
he calls “the New Holy Trinity,” as an outright rejection of Justice Scalia’s ver-

115

See Merrill, supra note 84, at 1091; Molot, supra note 6, at 40–41. Professor Molot has
argued that in attempting to distinguish themselves from purposivists, textualists have overemphasized the line between clarity and ambiguity both by being overly willing to conclude
that their methods can “eliminate” ambiguity and by making the implications of an ambiguity finding too weighty. Id. at 50–51. The manipulation of the line between clarity and ambiguity, he contends, gives textualist judges ample leeway in interpretation, aggravating the
problem of the improper exercise of judicial discretion that textualists seek to curtail. See id.
at 50. To the extent textualism played a role in elevating the significance of ambiguity findings, its success was instrumental in creating the incentives resulting in absurdity in disguise.
116 JELLUM, supra note 21, at 89.
117 Id. at 87–89.
118 See id.
119 For an in-depth discussion of Hart’s problem from a textualist perspective, see SCALIA &
GARNER, supra note 2, at 36–38.
120 See generally Richard M. Re, The New Holy Trinity, 18 GREEN BAG 2d 407, 407–17
(2015), http://www.greenbag.org/v18n4/v18n4_articles_re.pdf [https://perma.cc/HJA6-K4H
C].
121 See id. at 413–15.
122 See id. at 409–11.
123 See id. at 411–13.
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sion of strong textualism.124 Professor Re contends that in these cases the Supreme Court has “repeatedly and visibly embraced” a more purposive, pragmatic approach.125
In contrast, this article views the ongoing interpretive shift as resulting
from textualism’s success and entrenchment. As illustrated throughout the cases described in Part III below, the Supreme Court opinions identified here and
by Professor Re (in addition to two decisions unique to this article) are rife with
textualist terminology, principles, and precedent. When statutory purpose is
considered, it is frequently (though not exclusively) through the lens of statutory context or the statutory scheme. Separation of powers and the proper role of
the judiciary are invoked as paramount concerns.126 The realities (and even vagaries) of the legislative process are repeatedly referenced. And, most significantly, ambiguity findings are central to the Court’s holdings. This more closely resembles lip service to, as opposed to outright abandonment of textualism:
rather than overtly disregard clear text, the text is instead labeled “ambiguous.”
A 2006 article by Professor Jonathan T. Molot may further illuminate the
distinction. Professor Molot argued that modern textualism is doomed to either
irrelevancy or normative unattractiveness because of the lack of meaningful
remaining distinctions between its approach and that of purpovisism.127 Significantly, he noted that textualists criticize purposivists for “continuing to look to
context after they have arrived at a clear textual meaning and of using their ongoing contextual inquiry to adjust or even contradict the clear textual meaning,”
whereas textualists “purport to use extratextual factors only before arriving at a
statute’s clear meaning, and never to contradict that clear meaning.”128 He argued that these approaches no longer differed importantly in effect and that the
differences in methodology were fairly insignificant, primarily as a result of
modern textualists’ attention to context in the determination of meaning.129
Crucially, consider Professor Molot’s example of a Supreme Court decision
exhibiting the irrelevance of the differing approaches in terms of the outcome.
In the same case, a concurring opinion of Justice Thomas noted, “If the text
were clear, resort to anything else would be unwarranted. But I agree with the
Court that [it] is ambiguous, rather than unambiguous as Justice Stevens con124

See Re, supra note 120, at 407 (noting that “purposivism seems to have evolved and, as a
result, to have gotten the upper hand”).
125 Id. at 408. Earlier works by other scholars predicted similar outcomes, warning that “aggressive” textualists would doom their approach if they insisted on doctrinal rigidity and
failed to acknowledge common ground already forged with purposivists. See, e.g., Molot,
supra note 6, at 48. Professor Jonathan R. Siegel went further, contending that the core tenets of textualism could not be moderated and remain internally consistent; thus, textualism
would necessarily, rather than contingently fail as a viable interpretive approach. See Siegel,
supra note 5, at 169.
126 This is not to imply, of course, that only textualists prioritize these concerns.
127 See Molot, supra note 6, at 2.
128 Id. at 4, 37.
129 See id. at 35–36.
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tends.”130 While Justice Stevens noted in his concurrence, “If an unambiguous
text describing a plausible policy decision were a sufficient basis for determining the meaning of a statute, we would have to affirm the judgment of the Court
of Appeals. . . . We can, however, escape [‘this unambiguous statutory command’] by using common sense.”131
This insight is particularly telling in light of Professor Re’s “New Holy
Trinity” and absurdity in disguise. Professor Molot may be correct that these
approaches do not differ significantly in practice, but the root cause of absurdity in disguise is courts’ unwillingness to adopt an overtly purposive approach.
Instead, judges purport to adhere to textualist principles and methodology; they
employ purposive considerations under the guise of ambiguity rather than
openly embrace them as illuminating or modifying otherwise clear text. The
obfuscation created by this evasion may entail more significant consequences
for methodology and for outcomes. And the incentive to obfuscate explains the
utility of absurdity in disguise—a form of reverse-ambiguity via purposivism’s
close cousin, the absurdity doctrine.132
Again, despite the complications outlined above, the determination and
resolution of statutory ambiguity is a broadly accepted part of the judicial role,
grounded squarely within the process of interpretation (and thus mostly immune from charges of constituting judicial “construction” or lawmaking). The
question, then, is how the relatively uncontroversial ambiguity doctrine can be
used to conceal the application of other canons like the absurdity doctrine. A
number of cases examined in the following section illustrate how this occurs in
practice.
The tension between textualism and the absurdity doctrine has manifested
itself in decisions at all levels of the federal courts through what I have referred
to as “absurdity in disguise.” In order to achieve what appears to them to be
sensible or correct results, judges have begun to employ findings of ambiguity
to open the door to deeper judicial inquiry. This enables judges to portray their
reasoning as falling squarely within the interpretive, rather than constructive
(note—in the undesirable sense, not construing) realm. And, unlike construction, interpretation is seen by textualists as an entirely appropriate part of the
judicial enterprise within the constitutional framework of separation of powers.
Thus, judges maintain an aura of objectivity while being permitted to consider
the results of various applications of the statutory text.

130

Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50, 67 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring)); see also Molot, supra note 6, at 38 n.160.
131 Molot, supra note 6, at 38 n.160 (quoting Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc., 543 U.S. at
65 (Stevens, J., concurring)).
132 See Re, supra note 120, at 418; see also Manning, supra note 15, at 2400 (noting that the
Supreme Court “has traditionally defended the absurdity doctrine as a version of strong intentionalism”).
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The following sections demonstrate the phenomenon in the decisions of
several courts confronting contested language in three widely different statutory regimes.
III. ABSURDITY IN DISGUISE IN PRACTICE: EXAMPLES FROM RECENT CASES
Spanning diverse matters at all levels of the federal courts, the cases below
share striking commonalities. In all of them, apparently clear text was treated
as ambiguous in order to avoid arguably unusual, unreasonable, or unconstitutional results—exactly the analysis that would be employed had the absurdity
doctrine been invoked explicitly. The odd or undesirable results of applying the
apparently clear text created doubt that the statutes at issue could actually mean
what they appear to say. The courts mask this reasoning somewhat by arguing
that ambiguity “derived from” or was “created by” the consequences of applying the apparent meanings—the implication being that the ambiguity was
preexisting, or at least linguistically present.133 But under the traditional, linguistic conception, ambiguity does not exist merely because multiple meanings
could possibly be attributed to the text upon further reflection on the consequences. Rather, ambiguity is a textually facial, ex ante phenomenon. Multiple
meanings are fairly possible because of the existence of ambiguity; ambiguity
does not exist because of the desirability or practicability of one meaning over
another. The absurdity doctrine, which imposes ambiguity ex post, in light of
the perceived consequences of applying statutory text, is distinguishable from
traditional ambiguity for precisely that reason. This is implied in common descriptions of the absurdity doctrine as permitting a judge to “look beyond” clear
text or to “treat” clear text as if it were ambiguous.
A. Bond v. United States
Carol Ann Bond, a microbiologist, discovered that her husband was the father of her best friend’s child.134 Seeking revenge, she stole an arsenic-based
chemical compound from her employer and obtained another chemical used to
print photographs and clean laboratory equipment, the latter available on Ama-

133

It is important here to distinguish absurdity in disguise from Supreme Court precedent
holding that apparently clear statutory text may actually be found ambiguous when placed in
context. The Court has ruled that the “meaning—or ambiguity—of certain words or phrases
may only become evident when placed in context” and “with a view to their place in the
overall statutory scheme.” Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
529 U.S. 120, 132–33 (2000). In a sense, ambiguity is also “created” in these instances.
However, the primary distinction is that the context and statutory scheme that give meaning
to (or illuminate the ambiguity of) a statutory term are textual sources. In contrast, the creation of ambiguity through the application of the absurdity doctrine occurs in light of the consequences of a statute’s application. Notably, Justice Scalia joined in the majority opinion in
Brown & Williamson. See id. at 124.
134 Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 852 (2014).
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zon.com.135 In high enough doses, both chemicals are potentially lethal.136 At
least twenty-four times, Bond dabbed small amounts of two chemicals on her
former best friend’s mailbox, car door, and door knob.137 Bond maintained that
she did not intend to kill Myrlinda Haynes, the intended victim, but rather intended to cause her to suffer an uncomfortable rash.138 Her efforts largely
failed; Haynes noticed the presence of the chemicals and avoided them almost
entirely.139 She did come into contact with a chemical once and received a minor thumb burn, which apparently needed no treatment other than rinsing with
water.140
Bond was eventually discovered and charged with mail theft after the post
office observed her stealing an envelope from Haynes’ mail and putting chemicals on Haynes’ car.141 However, she was also charged with possession and use
of a chemical weapon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 229(a), a provision of the
Chemical Weapons Implementation Act (“the Act”).142 Congress passed the
Act to implement the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction
(“the Convention”), a 1997 treaty intended to expand the Geneva Convention’s
prohibitions of the use of chemical weapons.143 The treaty was the result of
concerns over the continued use of chemical weapons, including mustard gas
and nerve agents, during and outside of wartime up until the 1990s.144
In federal district court, Bond argued that the chemical weapons charge
should be dismissed because the Act was outside the scope of Congress’ power
and intruded on traditional state authority in violation of the Tenth Amendment.145 After the court denied her motion, she pleaded guilty but reserved her
right to appeal.146 On appeal, the Third Circuit initially ruled she lacked standing to challenge the Act, but the Supreme Court reversed that decision.147 When
the case was remanded, Bond argued that the Act was intended to prohibit the
use of chemical weapons for “warlike” activities, as evidenced by an exception
to the Act that permitted the use of chemical weapons for “peaceful purpos-

135

Id.
Id.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 848–49. The Geneva Protocol’s prohibition of chemical weapons extended to state
actors during times of war; the Convention broadened this prohibition “to exclude completely the possibility of the use of chemical weapons . . .” Id. at 849.
144 Id.
145 Id. at 852–53.
146 Id. at 853.
147 Id.
136
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es.”148 While Bond conceded that her use of chemicals was wrongful, she contended it was not the type of act that the Convention and Act were enacted to
prevent.149 The Third Circuit disagreed, ruling that Bond’s activities certainly
could not be considered “peaceful” and were thus outside the exception to the
Act.150 While the Third Circuit noted that the Act was extremely broad, it nevertheless ruled that it was within Congress’ authority because the Convention
was valid; thus, a statute enacted to implement it in accordance with the Necessary and Proper Clause is also valid.151 The Supreme Court again granted certiorari.152
Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion for the majority began with a discussion of
federalism and enumerated powers, but noted quickly the well-settled principle
that these constitutional questions should be avoided if at all possible.153 Because Bond had raised the argument that the Act did not even cover her conduct, the Court chose to address the statutory interpretation question first.154
The Act provides that no one shall knowingly “develop, produce, otherwise
acquire, transfer directly or indirectly, receive, stockpile, retain, own, possess,
or use, or threaten to use, any chemical weapon.”155 In a definitional section,
“chemical weapon” is defined as “[a] toxic chemical and its precursors, except
where intended for a purpose not prohibited under this chapter as long as the
type and quantity is consistent with such a purpose.”156 “Toxic chemical” is defined as:
[A]ny chemical which through its chemical action on life processes can
cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or
animals. The term includes all such chemicals, regardless of their origin
or of their method of production, and regardless of whether they are produced in facilities, in munitions or elsewhere.157
Finally, as noted above, the Act excepts from the prohibition the use of such
chemicals for peaceful purposes, including “industrial, agricultural, research,
medical, or pharmaceutical activity or other activity . . .”158
The Court rejected the Government’s argument that the Act clearly encompassed Bond’s conduct. Drawing on a number of examples of “background
principles of construction,” the Court concluded that the statute must be read in
light of its context and purpose and consistent with constitutional principles and
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 853–85.
Id. at 854.
Id. at 854–55.
Id. at 855.
Id. at 851 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 229(a)(1)).
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 229F(1)(A)).
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 229F(8)(A)).
Id. (interal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 229F(7)).
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limitations.159 Particularly where the balance of power between the federal
government and the states is concerned, the Court has been reluctant to construe federal statutes in a way that would intrude on areas of “traditional state
responsibility.”160 Citing several cases in which the Court had narrowed the
reach of federal statutes on this basis, the Court concluded:
These precedents make clear that it is appropriate to refer to basic principles of federalism embodied in the Constitution to resolve ambiguity in
a federal statute. In this case, the ambiguity derives from the improbably
broad reach of the key statutory definition given the term—“chemical
weapon”—being defined; the deeply serious consequences of adopting
such a boundless reading; and the lack of any apparent need to do so in
light of the context from which the statute arose—a treaty about chemical warfare and terrorism. We conclude that, in this curious case, we can
insist on a clear indication that Congress meant to reach purely local
crimes, before interpreting the statute’s expansive language in a way that
intrudes on the police power of the States.161
As other scholars have noted, this reasoning turns that traditional constitutional avoidance canon on its head.162 Rather than apply it only after the court
finds a statute is ambiguous in order to select among possible interpretations,
the canon is employed here in a way that creates ambiguity from apparently
clear text.163 Notably, the Court addressed Justice Scalia’s objection in his concurring opinion that the cases cited by the majority in support of its holding
were inapposite because they dealt with statutes that were unclear at the outset:
“We agree; we simply think the statute in this case is also subject to construction, for the reasons given.”164 Thus, while concluding that the avoidance principles underlying the previous cases were applicable in Bond, the Court seemingly acknowledged that the source of ambiguity in the instant case differed
from the precedent cited.
In concluding the opinion, the Court noted that its disagreement with the
dissenting justices “reduces to whether [the Act] is ‘utterly clear.’ ”165
We think it is not, given that the definition of ‘chemical weapon’ in a
particular case can reach beyond any normal notion of such a weapon,
that the context from which the statute arose demonstrates a much more
limited prohibition was intended, and that the most sweeping reading of
the statute would fundamentally upset the Constitution’s balance between national and local power. This exceptional convergence of factors

159
160
161
162
163
164
165

Id. at 857–860.
Id. at 858.
Id. at 859–60.
See generally Fish, supra note 97.
See id. at 1275.
Bond, 872 U.S. at 860 n.2 (emphasis added).
Id. at 865.
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gives us serious reason to doubt the Government’s expansive reading of
[the Act], and calls for us to interpret the statute more narrowly.166
Perhaps most revealingly, the Court called the case “unusual,” and cautioned, “our analysis is appropriately limited.”167 These qualifications are highly suggestive of the conflicts underlying absurdity in disguise. It would be difficult in any case for a judge to ignore entirely the consequences of applying
such sweepingly broad text as it is written where the options are effectively either to rewrite federalism or strike the provision as unconstitutional. But perhaps even more important is the difficulty of ignoring these consequences in a
case with facts that seem unlike any Congress would have contemplated when
drafting the statute. Without the absurdity doctrine as a fail-safe, and with the
Court’s textualist precedent requiring commitment to statutory text, the only
escape from the text was through a finding of ambiguity.
Bond also exploited one of the key characteristics of ambiguity that makes
it an effective disguise for the use of the absurdity doctrine. Bond dealt with an
extremely broad statute that plainly, but oddly, encompassed conduct that
seemed outside the scope of what Congress must have intended to reach. Even
though questions of scope are more properly considered problems of vagueness
(if anything), the Court classified the statute’s problem as one of ambiguity.
Although the majority acknowledged in a footnote that it was engaging in
“construction” of the statute, its decision to ground its decision in ambiguity
perhaps belied its unwillingness to overtly subvert clear meaning. Acknowledging that the statute was vague would have made the Court’s use of the absurdity
doctrine far more transparent—after all, the infamous Holy Trinity Church168
opinion openly narrowed the scope of a broad statutory term. Even Justice
Scalia has endorsed the narrow use of the absurdity doctrine as a method of
correcting overly broad statutory terms.169
Finally, Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion is illuminating. He expressed
bewilderment over the analysis employed by the majority in reaching its conclusion. He found the statute’s meaning to be “plain” and its application to
Bond’s case “hardly complicated.”170 He blamed the majority’s conclusion that
the statute was ambiguous on “result-driven antitextualism,” noting that it inverted the avoidance canon to hold that potentially unconstitutional effects of
applying a statute’s plain meaning can render the text ambiguous.171 “Imagine
what future courts can do with that judge-empowering principle: Whatever has
improbably broad, deeply serious, and apparently unnecessary consequences
. . . is ambiguous!”172 Justice Scalia agreed that the statute was likely unconsti166
167
168
169
170
171
172

Id. at 866.
Id. at 865.
Holy Trinity Church v. United States,143 U.S. 457, 460 (1892).
See Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
Bond, 572 U.S. at 567–68 (Scalia, J., concurring).
See id. at 868.
Id. at 870.
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tutional due to its breadth, but would not have permitted that result to impact
the interpretation.173
Although the late Justice accused the majority of “anti-textualism,” his
frustration may better be explained in light of absurdity in disguise. The majority’s opinion did not flatly reject textualism—on the contrary, the majority described its analysis using Justice Scalia’s “fair reading” label; took great care to
couch its analysis in terms of context, shared understandings, and the background norms of legislating; and invoked ambiguity as a justification for considering broader statutory purposes. Perhaps Justice Scalia’s ire came from his
perception that his beloved doctrine was overtly invoked, yet turned on its
head—largely as a result of its own successes.
B. Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), LLC
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010
(“DFA”), a Congressional response to the financial crisis of 2008, provides enhanced protections for whistleblowers who report an employer’s violation of
various securities or other federal laws.174 Although the general trend of the
DFA expands on the whistleblower protections authorized by the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”),175 the opposite appears to result under the DFA’s
anti-retaliation provisions, which protect whistleblowers from adverse action
by employers as a result of specified protected activity.176 Under SOX, employers are prohibited from retaliating against whistleblowers who either report
violations internally to the company (i.e., “inside whistleblowers”),177 or who
report violations externally to the Securities and Exchange Commission

173

See id. at 872.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h) (2012); see also Asadi v. G.E. (USA) Energy, L.L.C., 720 F.3d
620, 622–23 (5th Cir. 2013).
175 See Jennifer M. Pacella, Inside or Out? The Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Program’s Antiretaliation Protections for Internal Reporting, 86 TEMP. L. REV. 721, 729 (2014) (describing how the DFA’s whistleblower provisions “significantly expand upon” those of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 by, for example, greatly extending the statute of limitations for
suits brought to enforce whistleblower protections).
176 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) (2012).
177 Under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual, an organization that is convicted of a
crime receives more leniency at sentencing if it had an effective compliance and ethics program in place. Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 8C2.5(f)(1) (U.S. Sentencing
Comm’n 2015) (establishing the existence of an effective compliance and ethics program as
a mitigating factor at sentencing); id. § 8B2.1 (defining an effective compliance and ethics
program, including the requirement that such program be “reasonably designed, implemented, and enforced so that the program is generally effective in preventing and detecting criminal conduct” but noting that the failure of a program need not mean it is not “generally effective”). The Guidelines provide that an effective compliance and ethics program requires an
organization to “take reasonable steps . . . to have and publicize a system . . . whereby the
organization’s employees and agents may report or seek guidance regarding potential or actual criminal conduct without fear of retaliation.” Id. § 8B2.1(b)(5). Thus, the Guidelines
incentivize organizations to encourage inside whistleblowing.
174
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(“SEC”) (“outside whistleblowers”).178 However, the DFA defines a “whistleblower” as “any individual who provides, or 2 or more individuals acting jointly who provide, information relating to a violation of the securities laws to the
Commission [the SEC], in a manner established, by rule or regulation, by the
[SEC].”179 The inclusion of “to the Commission” limits the definition to outside
whistleblowers, excluding inside whistleblowers who report violations to their
employers.
Further, DFA’s anti-retaliation protections expressly cover only “whistleblowers”:
No employer may discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, directly
or indirectly, or in any other manner discriminate against, a whistleblower in the terms and conditions of employment because of any lawful act
done by the whistleblower—
(i) in providing information to the Commission in accordance with this
section;
(ii) in initiating, testifying in, or assisting in any investigation or judicial
or administrative action of the Commission based upon or related to
such information; or
(iii) in making disclosures that are required or protected under [specified federal laws], and any other law, rule, or regulation subject to the
jurisdiction of the Commission.180
Thus, on its face, the statute appears to exclude whistleblowers who fail to report securities violations directly to the SEC from the ambit of the DFA’s antiretaliation protections. Nevertheless, the SEC issued a rule pursuant to its regulatory authority under the statute providing that the “whistleblowers” protected
under the anti-retaliation provisions include both inside and outside whistleblowers.181 The SEC relied on the third prong of the DFA’s anti-retaliation protections, which protect disclosures “required or protected under” numerous federal laws, including SOX.182 Because SOX protects both internal and external
whistleblowers, the SEC reasoned that internal whistleblowers were covered
under the third prong of DFA’s anti-retaliation provisions, despite not being included in the DFA’s definition of whistleblower.183
Two federal circuit courts and numerous district courts have addressed this
issue. Most of the district courts have ruled that the DFA does protect inside

178

See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1)(A)–(C) (2012); see also Pacella, supra note 175, at 732
(noting that “§ 806 of SOX clearly protects both internal and external whistleblowers”).
179 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (2012) (emphasis added).
180 Id. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
181 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F–2(b) (2019), invalidated by Asadi v. G.E. Energy, L.L.C., 720 F.3d
620 (5th Cir. 2013) (“For purposes of the anti-retaliation protections afforded by [15 U.S.C.
§ 78u-6(h)(1)], you are a whistleblower if . . . [y]ou provide . . . information in a manner described in [15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)].”).
182 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii); 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F–2(b).
183 See Pacella, supra note 175, at 730–33 for a detailed summary of the SEC’s process in
enacting the rule.
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whistleblowers.184 Notably, the Fifth and Second Circuits have reached opposite conclusions on the issue. Below, I contrast the opinions of the Fifth and
Second Circuits, which offer a remarkable illustration of absurdity in disguise
and textualism’s role in its existence.
The Fifth Circuit’s decision, Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), LLC,185 offers a
classic textualist analysis of the statute. Early in the court’s analysis, it emphasized the preeminence of statutory text: “When faced with questions of statutory construction, ‘we must first determine whether the statutory text is plain and
unambiguous’ and, ‘[i]f it is, we must apply the statute according to its
terms.’ ”186 “If the statutory text is unambiguous, our inquiry begins and ends
with the text.”187 Turning to the definition section, the court concluded that the
DFA’s definition of “whistleblower,” at least “standing alone,” clearly applied
only to whistleblowers who report violations to the SEC.188
The court rejected the holdings of several district courts who found either
that the statutory scheme was ambiguous or conflicting189 because of the ten184

For a more complete list of citations to district court decisions on the issue, see Berman
v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 153 (2d Cir. 2015).
185 Asadi v. G.E. Energy, LLC, 720 F.3d 620 (5th Cir. 2013).
186 Id. at 622 (alteration in original) (quoting Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 387 (2009)).
187 Id. (citing BedRoc Ltd. v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 183 (2004)).
188 See id. at 623.
189 See id. at 624–25, 624 n.6. In an interesting (though unreported) decision, a district court
found that the DFA’s whistleblower provision and anti-retaliation provisions contradicted
one another, but noted that the plaintiff’s argument that Congress intended the definition to
include inside whistleblowers would read the phrase “to the Commission” out of the definition entirely, rendering the phrase surplusage. See Egan v. TradingScreen, Inc., No. 10 Civ.
8202(LBS), 2011 WL 1672066, at *4–5 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2011). In light of this, the court
resolved the conflict by treating the third prong of the anti-retaliation provision as a “narrow
exception” to the DFA’s whistleblower definition, thus protecting only those inside whistleblowers whose disclosures fall under the third prong (finding that the third prong creates a
broader definition of “whistleblowers” than is applicable under the rest of the statutory
scheme). See id. at *5. Notably, the court began this analysis by noting its duty to first “determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to
the particular dispute in the case.” Id. at *4 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002)). For similar analyses citing Egan,
see Genberg v. Porter, 935 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1106 (D. Colo. 2013) (noting that the “plain
language” of the DFA encompasses only outside whistleblowers, but following Egan’s “narrow exception” holding because the DFA’s whistleblower definition “is in direct conflict”
with its anti-retaliation provisions); Nollner v. S. Baptist Convention, Inc., 852 F. Supp. 2d
986, 994 (M.D. Tenn. 2012). Other district courts adopting the “narrow exception” characterization more explicitly viewed the issue as one of ambiguity: “I do not believe it is unambiguously clear that the Dodd-Frank Act’s retaliation provision only applies to [outside whistleblowers].” See Kramer v. Trans-Lux Corp., No. 3:11CV1424, 2012 WL 4444820, at *4
(D. Conn. Sept. 25, 2012); see also Murray v. UBS Sec., LLC, No: 12 Civ. 5914(JMF), 2013
WL 2190084, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2013) (deferring to the SEC’s interpretation of the
DFA after finding statutory ambiguity “aris[ing] from the tension between” the definition
and the anti-retaliation provisions). The Murray court found that both the “narrow exception” interpretation and an interpretation limiting anti-retaliation protections solely to outside
whistleblowers were both “competing, plausible interpretations”; thus, the text “is ambiguous in conveying Congress’s intent.” Id. at *5 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting

19 NEV. L.J. 741, DOVE

Spring 2019]

5/27/2019 4:23 PM

ABSURDITY IN DISGUISE

775

sion between the DFA’s definition section and its anti-retaliation provisions.190
The court distinguished between the definition’s classification of protected persons from the anti-retaliation provision’s classification of protected activities.191 A conflict would only arise, the court reasoned, if both sections of the
DFA were read as definition sections.192 The court bolstered this conclusion by
noting that interpreting the DFA to cover inside whistleblowers would render
the clause “to the [SEC]” in its definition section superfluous.193 Moreover,
bringing inside whistleblowers under the purview of the DFA through the third
prong of the anti-retaliation provision would arguably render SOX’s antiretaliation protections largely superfluous, as well, at least in the sense that every SOX anti-retaliation claim could be brought instead under the DFA.194
Throughout the Fifth Circuit’s decision, it frequently referred to plain
meaning and unambiguous text in support of its decision that some have argued
flies in the face of the DFA’s clear intent to enlarge the whistleblower protections under SOX.195 The Second Circuit, which examined the issue in Berman
v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC,196 took a vastly different approach. The court’s introductory sentences immediately highlighted the apparent “tension” in the DFA’s
whistleblower protection provisions and concluded that “the pertinent provisions of Dodd-Frank create a sufficient ambiguity to warrant our deference to
the SEC’s interpretive rule . . .”197 And after describing the background of the
case and the statutory scheme at issue, the court again used this description:
[T]he more precise issue in the pending appeal is whether the arguable
tension between the definitional section . . . and [the third prong of the
anti-retaliation provision] creates sufficient ambiguity as to the coverage
of [the third prong] to oblige us to give Chevron deference to the SEC’s
rule.198
Cohen v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 498 F.3d 111, 120 (2d Cir. 2007)). The court found that
the existence of ambiguity warranted Chevron deference and also invoked the rule against
surplusage in support of the “narrow exception” reading. See id. For a district court decision
rejecting these decisions, see Verfuerth v. Orion Energy Sys., Inc., 65 F. Supp. 3d 640 (E.D.
Wisc. 2014) (“In short, the belief that there is some kind of conflict in the statute is based on
a flawed understanding of the concept of statutory ambiguity.”).
190 See Asadi v. G.E. Energy, L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 625–26 (5th Cir. 2013).
191 Id. at 625 (“The three categories listed in [15 U.S.C.] § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) represent the protected activity in a whistleblower-protection claim. They do not, however, define which individuals qualify as whistleblowers.”).
192 Id. at 626.
193 Id. at 628.
194 See id.
195 See, e.g., Pacella, supra note 175, at 743–48.
196 Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145 (2d Cir. 2015).
197 Id. at 146 (emphasis added). Perhaps even more tellingly, the court explicitly compared
the situation to the Supreme Court’s decision on the Affordable Care Act in King v. Burwell,
135 S. Ct. 2480, 2506 (2015), discussed in the following section of this article as another
example of absurdity in disguise. See id. at 150, 155; infra Section III.C.
198 Id. at 148 (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984)).
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The Second Circuit invoked “tension” (although not direct conflict) between two provisions at issue, along with one provision’s last-minute addition
during the legislative process—this latter argument, ironically, typically used to
justify the textualist approach to statutory interpretation. Turning to its analysis,
the court determined that although there was “no absolute conflict” between the
two provisions, it nevertheless agreed with the findings of many district courts
that there was tension between the provisions.199 The court examined the legislative history for a resolution and found nothing directly on point, but did note
that the anti-retaliation third prong had been inserted close to the end of the
drafting process.200 While the court acknowledged that statutorily defined terms
generally are to be read literally and applied throughout the applicable portions
of the statute, it found these general rules inapposite in light of prong three’s
late insertion in the statute.201 The court cited the complexities of the legislative
process in support of this finding.202 The court noted that the realities of legislative drafting also suggested that the last-minute insertion of the third antiretaliation prong may have been done hastily and without the intent that it be
limited by the narrow definition provision.203 Essentially, the tension at least
raised the question of congressional intent; because the court could not resolve
the question based on the text or using legislative history, it found the statute
ambiguous.204 “[T]he tension [in the DFA] renders [it] sufficiently ambiguous
to oblige us to give Chevron deference . . . . [W]e need not resolve the ambiguity ourselves, but will defer to the reasonable interpretive rule adopted by the
appropriate agency.”205
Stunningly, while couching its reasoning in terms of an ambiguity analysis,
the court initially compared the case to Holy Trinity Church,206 the classic
paragon of the absurdity doctrine. Most significantly, the court appeared to
back away from the comparison, finding that another case was “[c]loser” to the
199

See id. at 150–51.
See id. at 152–55.
201 See id. at 154.
202 Id. The court also used its legislative process arguments to reject arguments from both
parties invoking the rule against surplusage, which was a key component of the Asadi court’s
decision and many district court rulings on the issue. See id. Even textualists concede that
the rule should be one of the earliest to jettison precisely because of the realities of legislative drafting. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 2, at 176, 179. Overall, the court’s invocation of
these arguments demonstrates the significant influence of textualism on modern statutory
interpretation—even courts ultimately guided by statutory purpose and congressional intent
take pains to justify their decisions using textualist doctrine.
203 Berman, 801 F.3d at 154–55.
204 See id. at 155.
205 Id. (emphasis added). Notably, the Supreme Court resolved the DFA circuit split in 2018
in Dig. Realty Tr., Inc. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767, 776 (2018). Upon concluding that the statutory definition unambiguously includes only those whistleblowers who report to the SEC,
the Court declined to apply Chevron deference to the SEC’s interpretation of the rule. Id. at
782.
206 Berman, 801 F.3d at 150.
200
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case at bar—King v. Burwell,207 the Supreme Court’s decision on the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”). In Burwell, the Court considered a definitional provision of the ACA that appeared to limit the availability of income tax subsidies
to those insured through state-established, but not federally-established health
exchanges.208 However, that limitation would have undermined the statutory
scheme and appeared vastly at odds with what the ACA was purportedly designed to do.209 As discussed in further detail in Section III.D, Burwell is another case in which a court used the anomalous result of applying apparently
plain text to conclude that statutory text was ambiguous.
This case exhibits a fairly low, Holy Trinity Church-type conception of absurdity, where the apparent meaning is not literally illogical or incomprehensible, but nevertheless odd and inconsistent with what is known about the purpose of the statute. But even as the Second Circuit recognized the parallels
between its reasoning and Holy Trinity Church,210 it ultimately characterized its
decision as grounded in statutory ambiguity—“[c]loser” to King v. Burwell.211
The concept of ambiguity in disguise reveals that both of the Second Circuit’s
comparisons were accurate because, in substance, King v. Burwell212 operated
precisely the same way as Holy Trinity Church.213 The decisions differ primarily in characterization, not operation: the hallmarks of absurdity in disguise.214
C. National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius
The Supreme Court of the United States confronted the first major challenge to the ACA in 2012 in National Federation of Independent Business v.

207

Id.
King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2490–91 (2015).
209 See id. at 2493. The Berman court’s discussion of the Supreme Court’s King v. Burwell
decision is some of the strongest evidence of absurdity in disguise in all the opinions examined herein—in fact, absurdity is nearly unmasked.
210 Berman, 801 F.3d at 150.
211 Id.
212 See generally Burwell, 135 S. Ct. at 2480.
213 See generally Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
214 Professor Richard M. Re previously identified the connection between Holy Trinity
Church, King v. Burwell, Bond v. United States, and Yates v. United States. See Re, supra
note 120, at 408–17. However, like other scholars, he views “the New Holy Trinity” as an
outright rejection of Justice Scalia’s version of strong textualism. See id. at 407–08 (noting
that “purposivism seems to have evolved and, as a result, to have gotten the upper hand”).
Further, Professor Re contends that the Supreme Court has “repeatedly and visibly embraced” a more purposive, pragmatic approach. Id. at 408. Earlier works by other scholars
predicted similar outcomes, warning that “aggressive” textualists would doom their approach
if they insisted on doctrinal rigidity and failed to acknowledge common ground already
forged with purposivists. See, e.g., Molot, supra note 6, at 48. Professor Jonathan R. Siegel
went further, contending that the core tenets of textualism could not be moderated and remain internally consistent; thus, textualism would necessarily, rather than contingently fail
as a viable interpretive approach. See Siegel, supra note 5, at 169–73, 176.
208
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Sebelius.215 Congress enacted the Patient Protection and ACA in 2010 with the
goals of reducing health care costs and improving health insurance coverage
rates in the United States.216 One of the ACA’s most significant provisions is an
“individual mandate,” which requires most Americans to purchase health insurance coverage; if an individual chooses not to do so, he or she must pay what
the ACA calls a “penalty” to the Internal Revenue Service.217 In Sebelius, one
of the challengers’ key arguments was that this central provision was an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’ power because it extended beyond the reach of
the Tax and Spend Clause under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution.218
The Government argued that the mandate should be interpreted not as requiring individuals to purchase insurance, but as a tax on those who choose not
to purchase it, despite the ACA’s mandatory language and characterization of
the payment for noninsurance as a “penalty.”219 Addressing this contention, the
majority of the Court noted that the “most straightforward reading of the mandate is that it commands individuals to purchase insurance.”220 If that were the
case, the mandate could not fall within Congress’ power to tax and spend.221
And, as the Court had already ruled that the individual mandate was not within
Congress’ commerce power, the mandate would be struck down if the Court
found it beyond the Tax and Spend Clause.222
Although the Court frequently used language evoking ambiguity, it is clear
that the high stakes of the potential result—striking down the individual mandate—was the lodestone of its opinion. The most persuasive support for this
proposition can be found in the Court’s own words: “The text of a statute can
sometimes have more than one possible meaning . . . . And it is well established
that if a statute has two possible meanings, one of which violates the Constitution, courts should adopt the meaning that does not do so.”223 As another example: “The question is not whether that is the most natural interpretation of
the mandate, but only whether it is a ‘fairly possible’ one. As we have ex-

215

See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 530–31 (2012).
Id. at 538.
217 Id. at 539.
218 See id. at 540. Additionally, the challengers contended that the ACA was impermissible
under the Commerce Clause, the other constitutional provision invoked by the Government
in support of Congress’ authority to enact the law. See id. Finally, the challengers also disputed the constitutionality of the ACA’s expansion of Medicaid. See id. at 541.
219 Id. at 562, 564. It is worth noting here that the Court also conceded that the Government’s proposed reading of the statute was entirely at odds with the reading it advocated in
support of its primary argument that the ACA was authorized by the Commerce Clause. See
id. at 561. Moreover, the Court determined that the Anti-Injunction Act did not bar it from
hearing the case on the ground that the ACA described the individual mandate as imposing a
“penalty,” not a tax. See id. at 564.
220 Id. at 562.
221 See id.
222 See id. at 561.
223 Id. at 562.
216

19 NEV. L.J. 741, DOVE

Spring 2019]

5/27/2019 4:23 PM

ABSURDITY IN DISGUISE

779

plained, ‘every reasonable construction must be resorted to, in order to save a
statute from unconstitutionality.’ ”224 And, most explicitly:
It is only because the Commerce Clause does not authorize such a command that
it is necessary to reach the taxing power question. And it is only because we
have a duty to construe a statute to save it, if fairly possible, that § 5000A can be
interpreted as a tax.225

These quotes evidence more than just a low threshold for an initial finding
of ambiguity—on the contrary, the ambiguity finding was the result of the consequences of its absence. Significantly, the Court called the interpretation of the
mandate as a penalty both the “most straightforward” and “the most natural”
reading.226 These descriptions seem far more akin to the characteristics of the
ordinary meaning favored by modern judges than to hyperliteralism of earlier
forms of “plain meaning” textualism. It is certainly uncharacteristic of “classic”
ambiguity given that the Court explicitly found one interpretation clearly more
plausible than another. In virtually every instance, a statutory provision could
be given more than one possible meaning—after all, were this not the case, the
absurdity doctrine’s solution of treating clear texts as ambiguous would never
resolve any of the problems it was designed to confront. Even minimal standards of ambiguity typically require multiple plausible meanings at the very
least.227 Also tellingly, the Court’s description of the interpretation ultimately
adopted as “fairly possible” is prototypical of the interpretations adopted in absurdity cases: even though a statute seems clear, a less intuitive, less obvious
meaning is adopted instead to avoid undesirable consequences. Thus, Sebelius
also exemplifies the feasibility of employing ambiguity due to the concept’s
malleability.
D. King v. Burwell and Halbig v. Burwell
The second major challenge to the ACA arose in King v. Burwell,228 a
Fourth Circuit decision that was eventually reviewed by the Supreme Court. At
the same time the Fourth Circuit ruled in King, the D.C. Circuit ruled in a case
brought on the same grounds in Halbig v. Burwell.229 The majority in Halbig
offers an interesting contrast to the Fourth Circuit’s decision, so it is also examined below after a brief overview of the issues under review.
In these cases, the plaintiffs challenged an IRS rule passed under the authority of the ACA that authorized tax credits for individuals who purchased
224

Id. at 563 (quoting Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 657 (1895)).
Id. at 574.
226 Id. at 562–63. The Court’s belief that this interpretation was the “most natural” can be
inferred from the Court’s statement that “[t]he question is not whether that is the most natural interpretation of the mandate, but only whether it is a ‘fairly possible’ one.” See id. at 563
(quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)).
227 See, e.g., JELLUM, supra note 21, at 87–88.
228 King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d 358, 365 (4th Cir. 2014), aff’d, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
229 Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d 390, 412 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
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insurance through either state-run or federally-run health exchanges.230 The establishment of state exchanges is governed by ACA § 1311, which requires
each state to establish a health exchange.231 A separate provision, § 1321, provides that if a state elects not to establish its own exchange, the Secretary of the
Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) “shall . . . establish and
operate such Exchange within the State . . . .”232 In the definition section of the
ACA, “Exchange” is defined as “an American Health Benefit Exchange” established under § 1311.233
In tandem with the individual mandate (the subject of the previous major
challenge to the statute), the ACA provided for tax credits to subsidize the purchase of health insurance as another means of making coverage affordable.234
This “premium assistance credit” is calculated based on a taxpayer’s monthly
premiums for a health plan “enrolled in through an Exchange established by the
State under [§ 1311 of the ACA] . . . .”235 Finally, the term “State” is defined in
the statute consistent with normal usage (i.e., not including the federal government).236 The plaintiffs in King and Halbig argued that the text of the ACA
plainly limits these premium tax credits to individuals purchasing insurance
through state exchanges because a federally-established exchange cannot be
“an Exchange established by the State . . .”237 Thus, the IRS rule purporting to
provide them to those insured through federal exchanges is contrary to the
ACA.238
1. King v. Burwell in the Fourth Circuit
The Fourth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs’ contention that the plain language of the text precluded the IRS rule. Instead, the court found that the statutory text was “ambiguous and subject to multiple interpretations”239 while acknowledging at the same time that “there is a certain sense to the plaintiffs’
position” that “the language says what it says[.]”240 The majority went on to
remark that the plaintiffs’ arguments had “common-sense appeal” and that “a
literal reading of the statute undoubtedly accords more closely with their position.”241 Furthermore, the court acknowledged that Congress could have used
broader language—as it did in other places throughout the statute—had it in230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241

See Halbig, 758 F.3d at 395; King, 759 F.3d at 364.
See Halbig, 758 F.3d at 394; King, 759 F.3d at 364.
See 42 U.S.C. § 18041(c)(1) (2012).
Id. § 18031(b)(1).
See 26 U.S.C. § 36B (2012).
Id. (emphasis added).
42 U.S.C. § 18024(d) (2012).
Halbig, 758 F.3d at 398; King, 759 F.3d at 368.
Halbig, 758 F.3d at 398; King, 759 F.3d at 368.
King, 759 F.3d at 363.
Id. at 368.
Id. at 369.
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tended to provide the tax credits to persons insured in both state and federal exchanges.242
Still, at first blush, the court’s ambiguity finding appears to be textuallybased, rather than policy-based. As noted, § 1311 purports to require each state
to establish a health exchange and provides that “[a]n Exchange shall be a governmental agency or nonprofit entity that is established by a State.”243 Moreover, the ACA’s definition section defines the statutory term “Exchange” as “an
American Health Benefit Exchange” established under [§ ] 1311.244 However,
§ 1321 of the ACA provides that the states may elect whether to establish an
exchange under § 1311; in the event that a state does not, § 1321(c) requires
that the federal government do so.245 The court emphasized the language of
§ 1321(c), which provides that the HHS Secretary “ ‘shall . . . establish and operate such Exchange within the State . . .’ ”246 The court concluded that the reference to “such Exchange” could operate to make federally-established exchanges the equivalent of state exchanges under § 1311—thus, by definition,
exchanges established by a state.247
The majority noted repeatedly that it found this construction more persuasive than the plaintiffs’.248 Notably, in a concurring opinion, Judge Davis
agreed with this conclusion to such an extent that he found the statute unambiguous.249 Even while characterizing the plaintiffs’ reading as the “straightforward” one, he concluded that their reading “strips away any and all possible
explanations for why Congress would have intended to exclude consumers who
purchase health insurance coverage on federally-run Exchanges from qualifying for premium tax credits.”250 Congress could not have intended “a reading
that has no legislative history to support it and runs contrary to the Act’s text,
structure, and goals” and which would “render[] the entire Congressional
scheme nonsensical.”251
Although the majority declined to adopt the concurring judge’s conclusion
that the statute was clear, it was by no means blind to the policy consequences
noted in the concurrence. On the contrary, the majority found it was “clear that
widely available tax credits are essential to fulfilling the Act’s primary goals
and that Congress was aware of their importance when drafting the bill.”252 Indeed, “the economic framework supporting the Act would crumble if the cred242
243
244
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246
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Id. at 368.
42 U.S.C. § 18031(d)(1) (2012).
Id. § 18031(b)(1).
See id. § 18041.
King, 759 F.3d at 369 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1321(c)).
Id.
See id. at 369–71.
See id. at 378 (Davis, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 374.

19 NEV. L.J. 741, DOVE

782

5/27/2019 4:23 PM

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 19:3

its were unavailable on federal Exchanges” and “without an exception to the
individual mandate, millions more Americans unable to purchase insurance
without the credits would be forced to pay a penalty that Congress never envisioned imposing on them.”253 “Tellingly, the plaintiffs do not dispute that the
premium tax credits are an essential component of the Act’s viability.”254
Significantly, however, the majority addressed the implications of the
competing constructions only after finding the statute ambiguous and as part of
its analysis of whether to afford Chevron deference to the IRS interpretation of
the statute.255 The quotes in the preceding paragraph supported the court’s conclusion that the IRS rule was a permissible construction of the statute and thus
entitled to Chevron deference.256 As evidenced by the concurrence, it would
certainly have been possible to use the quoted propositions to bolster the conclusion that the statute unambiguously permitted the availability of credits for
federal exchange insureds—though that would require a much more transparently purposive interpretive approach. At the same time, in a literal sense, a
federally-established exchange cannot be an exchange “established by the
State.” The majority was unwilling to disregard the literal, “common sense”
reading of the text, but neither could it ignore the implications of rigid adherence to it. Invoking Chevron—which requires an analysis of whether an agency’s interpretation is permissible, not whether it is consistent with the most natural reading (i.e., ordinary meaning)—permitted the court to consider policy
implications indirectly, through the discussion of the competing concerns
weighed by the agency. The court’s use of ambiguity to open the door to Chevron is even more noteworthy given the court admitted that it found the Government’s construction more persuasive than the plaintiffs’, despite noting the
“literal” import of the text and “the common-sense appeal of the plaintiffs’ argument . . .”257 And, as noted, the concurring opinion offered a path to the same
result without a finding of ambiguity. The majority’s ambivalence evinces a reluctance to adopt overtly purposive reasoning and a discomfort with the results
of adopting a “purely” textualist approach.258 Finding the text ambiguous per253

Id. at 375.
Id.
255 See id. at 373–75.
256 See id.
257 Id. at 369.
258 I do not contend here that textualism would necessarily or indisputably require a finding
that the tax credits were unavailable to consumers in federal exchanges. As emphasized
throughout this article and in the literature on modern textualism generally, textualism does
not seek “hyper-literal” interpretations; instead, the meanings of statutory terms are to be
considered contextually. Of course, the scope of that context and the dividing line between
literal and hyper-literal interpretations are debated even among judges and scholars selfidentifying as textualist. However, Justice Scalia, textualism’s most prominent proponent,
later took the position that textualism clearly mandated the plaintiffs’ construction. See King
v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2496–97 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Although admittedly
speculative, the claim that most judges and scholars familiar with his work would have expected this outcome does not seem overly controversial.
254
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mitted the incorporation of statutory purpose and policy into the majority’s decision in a less controversial way than the concurrence’s overtly resultsoriented approach.259
2. Halbig v. Burwell in the D.C. Circuit
In the same month the Fourth Circuit ruled in King v. Burwell,260 the D.C.
Circuit ruled in Halbig v. Burwell, 261 a case raising the same challenge to the
availability of tax credits to insurance purchasers in federal exchanges under
the IRS’s interpretation of the ACA. The D.C. Circuit’s majority opinion
reached a result different from both the majority and concurring opinions of the
Fourth Circuit in King: the court ruled that the ACA unambiguously permitted
tax credits only for purchasers of insurance in state exchanges because federal
exchanges are not exchanges established by a state.262
The D.C. Circuit agreed that § 1321’s requirement that HHS establish
“such Exchange” in the event that a state elects not to do so created an equivalence between state and federal exchanges “in terms of what they are and the
statutory authority under which they are established.”263 However, the court
found that this equivalence did not extend to the treatment of state and federal
exchanges for the purpose of the tax credits because the “subsidies also turn on
a third attribute of Exchanges: who established them.”264 The “such Exchange”
language in § 1321, while referencing § 1311, did not make federallyestablished exchanges “established by the State” simply in virtue of being
treated as established under the same statutory provision.265 The court emphasized that Congress easily could have ensured that federal exchanges were
treated exactly like state exchanges by explicitly requiring it—as it did, in fact,
with respect to exchanges created by U.S. territories, in which case the territories are to “be treated as a State.”266
The majority also rejected a dissenting judge’s argument that § 1311(d)(1)
provided this equivalency, concluding instead that it is not a definition section.267 The ACA’s definition section simply defines exchanges as those established under § 1311.268 The court concluded it would be incongruous at best for
259

And, as noted, the primacy of statutory text is well-established in Supreme Court precedent on interpretation and textualism’s influence on this precedent is widely acknowledged.
Thus, we should expect that Fourth Circuit judges concerned with properly adhering to precedent would be wary of undermining statutory text and, thus, inclined to couch their reasoning in textualist-leaning terms.
260 King, 759 F.3d at 359.
261 Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d 390 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
262 Id. at 393–94.
263 Id. at 399–400.
264 Id. at 400.
265 Id. at 398–99.
266 See id. at 400.
267 See id. at 400–01.
268 See id. at 399 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 300gg–91(d)(21)).
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Congress to choose § 1311, which authorizes state exchanges, as the place to
alter the ACA’s general definition of exchange and essentially create a legal
fiction with regard to the treatment of federal exchanges.269
The court next considered and rejected the Government’s argument that the
plaintiffs’ construction of the text rendered various other provisions of the
ACA absurd. Emphasizing the high threshold for absurdity and the concerns
that broad versions of the absurdity doctrine pose for “the rule-of-law objectives implicit in the Constitution’s strict separation of lawmaking from judging,”270 the court found that no result of applying the plain meaning of the text
was irreconcilable with either the apparent or conceivable purpose of the statutory scheme.271 Moreover, the court emphasized the vagaries of the legislative
bargaining process, noting that the Supreme Court has cautioned that “no legislation pursues its purposes at all costs.”272
Significantly, the majority concluded by admitting that it reached its decision “frankly, with reluctance” given the “major consequences” and “high . . .
stakes” involved.273 Nevertheless, “Congress is supreme in matters of policy,
and the consequence of that supremacy is that our duty when interpreting a
statute is to ascertain the meaning of the words of the statue duly enacted
through the formal legislative process.”274
3. The Supreme Court’s Decision in King v. Burwell
In light of the conflicting opinions of the Fourth and D.C. Circuits in King
and Halbig, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in King v. Burwell275 to consider the validity of the IRS rule making tax credits available to insureds in
both state and federal exchanges. After briefly reviewing the history and key
mechanisms of the ACA, Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, addressed whether Chevron deference should be afforded to the IRS.276 Breaking
269

See id. at 400–01.
See id. at 402 (summarizing John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L.
REV. 2387, 2434–35 (2003)).
271 See id. at 402–06.
272 Id. at 411 (citations omitted).
273 Id. at 412.
274 Id. A concurring opinion filed in the case was even more matter of fact in its textualist
underpinnings, arguing that adopting the Government’s construction “would be to engage in
distortion, not interpretation.” See id. (Randolph, J., concurring). On the contrary, a vigorous
dissent filed by Judge Edwards would have found the statute ambiguous, largely on the
ground that the plaintiffs’ construction would “thwart a central element of the ACA.” See id.
at 413 (Edwards, J., dissenting). “It is inconceivable that Congress intended to give States
the power to cause the ACA to ‘crumble.’ ” Id. While the dissent in Halbig is a paradigmatic
example of absurdity in disguise, the opinion is not discussed in detail here to avoid redundancy in light of its similarity to the Supreme Court’s majority opinion in its review of King
v. Burwell. See infra Part III.D.3.
275 King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
276 See id. at 2488–89.
270
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from the approaches of the lower courts, the Court summarily ruled that even if
the ACA was ambiguous, Chevron was inapposite.277 The significance of the
issue from both a political and economic standpoint made this one of the rare
and “extraordinary” cases in which it is inconceivable that Congress could have
intended to delegate the decision to an agency.278 Rather, the majority concluded that even if the statutory language was ambiguous, the resolution of its
meaning must be determined by the Court.279
The Court next turned to the text of the relevant statutory provisions, emphasizing the importance of context and the broad statutory scheme in the determination of the meaning of statutory text.280 Relying in part on the “such Exchange” language of § 1321, the Court found that the phrase “an Exchange
established by the state under [§ 1311]” was ambiguous.281 Although the Court
acknowledged that the phrase “established by the State” would be entirely superfluous had Congress intended that the credits be available for both state and
federal exchanges, it brushed this concern aside on the ground that the canon
against surplusage is “not absolute.”282 More tellingly, the Court noted the
“such Exchange” language only after an extensive discussion of healthcare reform in the United States going back to the 1990s.283 Moreover, the Court
frankly acknowledged that the Government’s interpretation was not the “most
natural reading.”284 Nevertheless, that reading was adopted because it was most
consistent with the Court’s view of the purpose of the legislation—surely, the
Court noted, Congress must have intended the tax credits to make the ACA
work; it could not have intended to embed a limitation that would ultimately
destroy legislative scheme.285
In King, Sebelius, and Bond, the Supreme Court invoked the constitutional
avoidance doctrine in justification for finding ambiguity. As noted, other scholars have identified the reverse-constitutional avoidance doctrine and have
pointed to Bond and other examples. While that insight is invaluable, this article demonstrates that the phenomenon displayed in those cases is actually much
broader and more prevalent. The reverse-avoidance doctrine is more properly
viewed as but one iteration of absurdity in disguise. Although the scope of the
absurdity doctrine has waxed and waned, its hallmark is permitting courts to
treat otherwise clear statutory text as ambiguous in order to avoid an absurd result (based on whatever degree or severity of absurdity is accepted in the par277

See id. at 2489.
Id. at 2488–89 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Fed. Drug Admin. v. Brown
& Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000)).
279 See id. at 2492.
280 See id.
281 See id. at 2489–90.
282 See id. at 2490, 2492 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Lamie v. United States
Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 536 (2004)).
283 See id. at 2485.
284 Id. at 2495.
285 See id. at 2496.
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ticular version employed). Not only does the reverse-avoidance doctrine share
this hallmark, the cases which exhibit it demonstrate that its application is strikingly similar to analyses in other cases where constitutional consequences do
not arise. The key factor is the absence of ex ante ambiguity; the ambiguity
finding comes only after examining the consequences of applying apparent
statutory meaning ex post.
Finally, unconstitutionality is certainly consistent with some versions of the
absurdity doctrine: the presumption that Congress would not intentionally enact
an unconstitutional statute rests at least in part on the feeling that it would be
ridiculous (or at least unreasonable) for it to do so. Arguably, even the most
grossly unfair or anomalous result of applying a statute in a particular case is
less a concern than a potentially unconstitutional result. And even Justice Scalia
has raised the specter of unconstitutionality as a consideration warranting the
use of the absurdity doctrine.286 “Reverse avoidance” may share a name and
similar concerns with traditional avoidance, but its operation and effect are far
more akin to the absurdity doctrine.
E. Yates v. United States
After harvesting undersized red grouper while fishing in federal waters off
the Gulf of Mexico, the defendant, John Yates, instructed a crew member to
throw the fish of questionable size overboard in order to prevent their discovery
during a routine inspection by the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation
Commission.287 For reasons unknown even to the Court, Yates was charged
with federal crimes more than thirty-two months later.288 After being indicted
and convicted, Yates appealed his conviction of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1519,
which provides:
“Whoever knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or tangible object
with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence the investigation or
proper administration of any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States or any case filed under title 11,
or in relation to or contemplation of any such matter or case, shall be
fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.”289
Notably, the statute was codified after being enacted as part of the SarbanesOxley Act, sweeping new financial legislation in response to the ethical
breaches leading to the implosion of Enron.290
Although the majority opinion concluded that a fish is, indeed, a tangible
object, the Court nonetheless declined to interpret § 1519 to encompass Yates’
286

See Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528–29 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
287 See Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1078 (2015).
288 Id. at 1080.
289 Id. at 1078 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1519).
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conduct. The Court emphasized that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was designed to
address “corporate and accounting deception and cover-ups . . .”291 In light of
the statutory history, the broad and unqualified term “[t]angible object” in
§ 1519 should be read to include only tangible objects “use[d] to record or preserve information . . . .”292
The Court’s opinion is rife with references to the statute’s purpose and
Congress’ likely intent. The Court acknowledged that “[t]he ordinary meaning
of an ‘object’ that is ‘tangible,’ as stated in dictionary definitions, is ‘a discrete
. . . thing.’ ”293 However, the majority found that this alone did not preclude a
finding of ambiguity, because ambiguity must be determined in context.294 To
that end, the majority employed a variety of canons of construction, considered
statutory headings and titles, and considered the broader purposes of the statute
in the context of its passage as part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.295 Significantly,
these tools were used not only to resolve the ambiguity in question, but to bolster the ambiguity finding itself. Like Bond, the Court’s approach here was to
narrow a broad statutory term to more closely align with its apparent purpose,
but under the guise of an ambiguity finding.
CONCLUSION
Textualism’s monumental influence, especially in Supreme Court precedent on interpretation, has elevated statutory text—not legislative purposes or
intentions—to the forefront of the interpretive inquiry. Numerous decisions of
the Court have instructed that where statutory text is unambiguous, it is to be
applied as it is written—even if the outcome is odd or seems ill-advised from a
policy perspective. Particularly in an increasingly polarized political environment, the devotion to text offers judges a way to minimize the perception of
improper judicial legislating in conflict with our constitutional structure.
Nevertheless, in practice, it is difficult to ignore the implications in a case
such as King or Sebelius, where the viability of an entire legislative overhaul of
the health insurance market in the United States is at risk. Or in a case where
significant international issues and longstanding traditions in our federalist system are at stake, as in Bond. And some cases, such as Bond and Yates, reveal
the fairly outlandish, ridiculous results that can occur where very broad statutes
are applied in specific circumstances. Debates abound over the desirability and
propriety of considering results as part of statutory interpretation. But regardless of one’s stance in this debate, the role of consequences in statutory interpretation may be inevitable.
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The intersection of this inevitability with textualism’s success is the root of
the development of the phenomenon of “absurdity in disguise.” Related to, yet
distinct from purposivism, absurdity in disguise allows judges to claim a variety of textualist precepts as their own while embracing results-oriented interpretations that would typically be impermissible under “pure” or strict textualism.
Yet this “best of both worlds” approach may suffer from conceptual incoherence if its closeness to purposivism continues to be minimized in the courts.

